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The aim of this interdisciplinary journal is to provide a forum for the exchange of information and expertise among nations in the area of international security, peace studies, and military cooperation-related issues as well as to emphasize the principle that “global problems require global solutions” with the effective contributions of all nations. With this view in mind, the publication will seek to establish an up-to-date knowledge base on peacekeeping operations undertaken by international bodies including NATO, the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization of African States. The review will be published twice yearly, fall and spring, by the Partnership for Peace Training Center (PfP TC) in Ankara, Turkey, under the auspices of NATO.

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Editor's Note

In the inaugural issue of Partnership for Peace Review, it was stated in my Editor's Note that the aim of the new publication, under the auspices of NATO, "is to provide a forum for exchange of information and expertise among nations in the areas of international security, peace studies and military cooperation and related issues, as well as to emphasize the principle that global problems require global solutions." The first issue has therefore included selected papers presented at the Silk Road Flag Officers Seminar "Towards a New Strategic Concept: the Future of NATO-Partners Relations" held in Çanakkale, Turkey on June 21-22, 2010. Contributors included both civilian and military experts representing NATO, EU, Turkey, the United States, Australia, Finland, Jordan and Burkina Faso.

This new issue of the Review continues to reflect global security concerns. The invited authors of the articles, officials and scholars, analyze a broad range of challenges and response opportunities for governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental organizations.

The first article by Guy Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMDs at NATO, discusses "NATO and Preventing the Proliferation of WMDs". It identifies the primary threat to the NATO alliance in the coming decades to be the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their use by terrorist organizations. The article reviews NATO's activities and initiatives to develop a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation; specifically highlighting the CBRN Defense Workshop, the creation of the Defense Against Terrorism and the CBRN Defense Centers Of Excellence along with the NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. The article finds that while over the last ten years NATO has built a number of robust capabilities against WMD proliferation it is hamstrung by scarce resources. The article concludes that WMD proliferation is a multifaceted threat that cannot be addressed by NATO alone and more international partnership building needs to be done to create a successful non-proliferation regime.

The second piece by Richard Prosen, a Foreign Affairs Officer at the US Department of State, on "NATO at 60: Transforming to Meet New Challenges" argues that to address the new security environment of the 21st Century NATO will need to transform itself to successfully confront the challenges of terrorism, insurgency, regional conflicts and humanitarian crisis. The article reviews various legal and institutional challenges facing NATO in its efforts in Afghanistan and its counter-piracy activities in the Horn of Africa. To address these challenges the author argues that NATO must develop 'smart power' public-private partnerships to address the challenges of violent extremism as well as develop counter-radicalization efforts. Structurally, NATO needs to revitalize its Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF) with a forward looking mandate to review NATO's institutional counterterrorism contributions to insure best practice policies are being followed. The article concludes that NATO's credibility in the future will depend on its ability to be a global security provider and successfully counter these specific security challenges. This requires modernizing, empowering and resourcing NATO to close the gap between structures, resources and security needs.

The next article by William J. Olson, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., on "Just War and Resistance: A Contradiction in Terms?" reviews the philosophical problems for the creation of a "Just Resistance" theory and its implications for the international system. The article discusses the problem for a theory of 'just resistance' to provide a competent authority with the ability to determine the justice of a resistance movement's cause. The author contrasts the American and French Revolutions with contemporary international resistance and terrorists movements to highlight the absence

of a competent authority today. Various arguments are then reviewed for whether contemporary resistance movements can, cannot, or do not need to develop a theory of justifying resistance. The article concludes with the implications for the international system if no theory of just resistance is possible: there is no basis for accommodation or reconciliation between the international system and resisters; a progressively disabled nation state system unable to sustain a viable international system; and the inability to accommodate these forces who are undermining the foundation of the nation state system increasingly leads to the inability of these actors to defend theories of international law and the resulted overpowering of the prospects for an enduring peace and just order.

The article by Amb. Edward Marks, a retired US Ambassador, discusses the reasons behind and means of a global response to terrorism in the nation-state system in “Terrorism: The Westphalian Response”. The nation-states of the world must use a multi-faceted approach to this dilemma individually, as a coalition, and through international organizations. The document goes through the uses of diplomacy between nation-states, the format of a strategic response, and the difficulties in confronting terrorism with a diplomatic approach. For the Westphalian system to work, each state must effectively yield power and security in its own territory, which is not evident in all countries today. The document concludes in saying the nation-state system is under attack, but that survival and self-interest should motivate countries to stop the threat of terrorism.

The penultimate article by Dr. Richard Weitz, Director of Policy and Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., on “Turkey and the New NATO” analyses the role of Turkey in relation to the NATO report “NATO 2020: Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement” are further explored and analyzed. It discusses the trilateral declaration of Turkey and Brazil in providing uranium to Iran, as well as Turkey's stance on nuclear powers and the NPT. The article describes the arsenal of US Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in Turkey at Incirlik and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems in Eastern Europe, the reasons for keeping them there, and security and policy implications involved with them, NATO, and Russia. The article concludes with a discussion of Turkey's important role in Afghanistan and the region.

Lastly, Prof. Dr. Ali Caglar, of Hacettepe University's Department of Political Science and Public Administration in Ankara, Turkey, studies the contributions made by Turkey to the global security. In order to reach this goal, today's concept of global security has been handled first within the context of historical and conceptual background, and then Turkey's contributions to the global security has been explained and discussed. As known, Turkey has made important contributions to UN and OSCE missions throughout the world in recent decades. The data needed for this paper have been collected from the related literature and the security institutions, both military and police, of Turkey.

Future volumes of the Review will consist of invited papers on other selected security topics as well as various timely conference proceedings. As always, appreciation is due to the PFP Center's staff in Ankara for their leadership and professionalism in publishing the Review as well as to the editorial personnel of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute, both in Washington, D.C.

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Editor's Note

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NATO and Preventing the Proliferation of WMDs

Guy B. ROBERTS¹

“Terrorism, increasingly global in scope and lethal in results, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years.”

- Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government at the Riga Summit, 29 November 2006

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has increasingly recognized the grave threat posed by WMD proliferation and the catastrophic potential of such weapons. At the Washington Summit in April of 1999 the Alliance adopted a then new Strategic Concept which declared that “... proliferation... can pose a direct military threat to the Allies’ populations, territory, and forces.” Further, the Concept committed the Alliance to the fight against WMD proliferation by stating that “The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means.”

The fight against WMD terrorism took on an increased urgency for the Alliance after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. In response, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—the collective defence clause—where this attack was considered an attack on all members of the Alliance. This event highlighted the need to develop capabilities to stop terrorist attacks, particularly those with a WMD dimension.

Consequently, at the Prague Summit in November 2002, Allies endorsed the implementation of a number of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence capabilities. These included a deployable NBC analytical laboratory, the creation of a rapidly deployable (less than 48 hours) NBC Joint Assessment Team; establishing a disease surveillance system, develop a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile; and create a virtual center of excellence for NBC

¹ Guy B. ROBERTS is currently is NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy.

weapons defence. Following this, at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 Allies adopted a package of anti-terrorist measures including one to detect, protect and defeat the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

These Summit initiatives were subsequently reaffirmed in the Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006, where Allies again expressed their concern that terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10-15 years with the most critical threat being a scenario where terrorists armed with WMD attack the population center of one or more Alliance member. Clearly, the Alliance has sought since the Washington Summit to prevent proliferation through an active political agenda of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation; as developing and harmonizing the defense capabilities mentioned above among others; and, when necessary, employing these capabilities consistent with political decisions in support of the Alliance's non-proliferation objectives.

This paper will briefly discuss some of the key activities and initiatives NATO is engaged in, as outlined already, and is expecting to do in the future in support of the Alliance's non-proliferation goals.

To provide the policy framework by which NATO will conduct its non-proliferation and CBRN defence activities at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in 2009, Heads of State and Government endorsed a key political statement on NATO's anti-WMD policy: The Alliance's *Comprehensive Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats*. As set forth in the new policy, the main goal is to secure populations, territory and forces of the Alliance from CBRN and WMD threats and maintain a robust deterrence posture to ensure its members are not coerced at any time by those potentially posing WMD threats. To achieve this goal the policy is broken down into three separate but related categories or pillars of the policy. (1) Prevention the proliferation of WMD, (2) protection against WMD attack or CBRN event and (3) recovery from a WMD attack, should one occur. Additionally, it refers to strategic enablers which will aid NATO to effectively undertake these three pillars of proliferation denial. These include the role of intelligence and information sharing, public diplomacy including, but not limited to, the Alliance's outreach to partners, and international and regional organizations. The Comprehensive Policy is the key document mandating NATO pursue a number of key initiatives in preventing WMD proliferation. While resource constrained, based on the guidance provided in the Comprehensive Policy, NATO has now embarked on a number of initiatives to counter the growing threat of WMD proliferation and terrorism.

NATO initiatives in the matter of countering WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism

At the Washington Summit the Allies agreed, in recognition of the importance to have a central location to coordinate anti-WMD proliferation activities, to create in May 2000 a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Centre. The Centre's main purposes are to seek ways to strengthen dialogue

and common understanding among member countries on issues related to the threat of weapons of mass destruction; to strengthen consultations on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues; to assess risks; and to support defense efforts that serve to improve the Alliance's preparedness to respond to the risks of WMD and their means of delivery. Furthermore, a wide ranging set of seminars and workshops organised by the WMD Centre provide an opportunity for experts from the Alliance, partners and other international organizations to review ongoing work and address current issues.

The most recent workshop took place on 23 and 24 March 2010 when NATO held a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Workshop and Exhibition at NATO Headquarters to share knowledge and skills in preventing, protecting and recovering from the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This workshop and exhibition on anti-proliferation technologies was one of NATO's largest partner events with over 220 participants from more than 45 countries, and four international organizations: the European Union, the European Defence Agency, the World Health Organization and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

With regard to NATO capabilities in meeting this challenge, in 2003 NATO created the Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion (now called the Joint Combined CBRN Task Force) and Joint Assessment Team, which since 2007 are part of the Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force. The Task Force is a component of the quick reaction NATO Response Force (NRF). These high readiness forces serve to protect against, and respond to, any incidents involving CBRN materials, and significantly adds to the specialized capabilities that the Alliance has to offer Allies and partners. It also has been deployed to and is available to support high visibility events following requests from nations such as during 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Athens and NATO's Istanbul and Riga Summits.

NATO is also finalizing a Near Real Time Disease Surveillance System which will be centrally located and hosted by Germany. It will enhance Alliance efforts to prevent and respond to any outbreaks of disease, whether naturally or deliberately caused, and novel biological warfare agents. This capability has been operationally tested and will be deployed to add a further element of monitoring, reach back, and recovery in the event of a biological attack on NATO's forces. The idea of the system is to rapidly collect, identify, analyze and disseminate information related to any biological outbreak, with the goal of responding rapidly to prevent and contain the spread of disease, thus limiting the initial loss of personnel and resources. It will also accelerate diagnoses of outbreaks of disease in order to develop vaccines and other methods to contain and limit the consequences of a disease outbreak to operational readiness.

To develop these initiatives, NATO has also created a number of "Centres of Excellence (COEs) and training centres for Partnership for Peace nations the concept of which was reaffirmed at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit in 2009. Overall responsibility for COE coordination and employment within NATO lies with Allied Command Transformation, a NATO military organization designed to help implement the transformation of military forces to meet emerging

threats and challenges to Alliance security. A “COE” is a nationally or multi-nationally sponsored entity, which offers recognised expertise and experience to the benefit of the NATO Alliance, especially in support of transformation. These include the Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) COE in Turkey and, the Joint CBRN COE in the Czech Republic.

DAT CoE in Turkey was established in Ankara on 28 June 2005 and received NATO (NAC) accreditation on the 14th of August 2006. The mission of the DAT CoE is to provide subject matter expertise, conduct DAT training and education, assist NATO in concept and doctrine development and to contribute to NATO standardization to improve capabilities and interoperability with regard to stopping terrorist groups. The DAT COE has served as a useful conduit for engaging in an exchange of views with NATO partner countries on all aspects of addressing the terrorist problem including WMD terrorism.

Another key COE is the Joint CBRN Defense Centre of Excellence in Vyskov, the Czech Republic, activated in July 2007. The Centre offers recognized expertise and experience for the Alliance on NBCR technologies and response actions in case of attack with an NBCR weapon, and it also supports NATO’s transformation process. It provides opportunities to improve interoperability and capabilities by enhancing multinational education, training and exercises; assisting in concept, doctrine, procedures and standards development; and testing and validating concepts through experimentation.

As part of the continuing education process of senior diplomatic and political leaders, NATO organizes on an annual basis a “close hold” seminar for NATO ambassadors and the Secretary General to discuss the ramifications of a crisis with a WMD dimension. This seminar has proven extremely useful in understanding what NATO’s capabilities are, what is currently lacking, and the many and varied responses and reactions to such an event if it should occur. Each seminar touches different aspects of WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism threats and NATO mechanisms for dealing with them. Potential topics have included possible terrorists’ acquisition of nuclear material of sufficient quantity to produce a nuclear yield that has been lost or stolen in a non-NATO country, in proximity to NATO deployed forces.

NATO is also actively working to improve civil preparedness and consequence-management capabilities in both Allied countries and Partner countries in response to potential attacks on the civilian population using CBRN agents. To combat this threat allies have established an inventory of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available to assist stricken countries, following a CBRN terrorist attack. This inventory is maintained by the -Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). The EADRCC was originally created in 1998 to coordinate responses to natural and man-made disasters and, since 2001, has been given the additional coordinating role of responding to potential terrorist acts involving CBRN agents. The centre has a standing mandate to respond to a national request for assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using such agents. It also organizes major international field exercises to practice responses to simulated disaster situations and consequence management.

In addition, NATO is also conducting a number of related outreach activities with its growing network of partners worldwide. To combat a WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism NATO actively cooperates with its network of partners worldwide. NATO's partnership network has been an area of great success for the Alliance. Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),² and with other partners such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Singapore, NATO has deepened cooperation and information sharing on WMD threats and strengthened non-proliferation initiatives, such as the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an initiative where like-minded states share intelligence and information on proliferated activities and conduct joint interdiction operations.

Another critical platform for exchanging views and information, sponsored by NATO, is the annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, held under the auspices of the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation. More than 60 countries participated in the last event, which took place in Warsaw, Poland in December 2009. These conferences consistently attract over 150 participants from over 50 different countries, representing a diverse array of experience and specialized knowledge.

This was the first NATO event of its kind to be held since the Alliance adopted its new Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against CBRN Threats. The Conference, hosted by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gathered participants from NATO and partner nations, including countries from the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Asia-Pacific region. Delegates had the opportunity to listen to and discuss presentations covering an array of topics including non-proliferation regimes, proliferation threats and challenges, NATO's contributions to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, and WMD Terrorism issues.

NATO has also recently developed a WMD Maritime Interdiction Operations course that takes place on an annual basis at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Centre in Souda Bay, Greece. The aim of the course is to provide students information on the political, legal, operational and tactical dimensions of WMD Maritime Interdiction Operations. The course is open to NATO and partner nations and will include both theoretical and practical issues as well as demonstrations on the latest technologies and techniques and tactics for interdicting suspect cargo. Eventually it is anticipated the course could be open to PSI partners as well. Since NATO is not officially a member of PSI or other non-proliferation initiatives it has been limited in its ability to actively participate in these initiatives even though all its member nation are either in or fully endorse such initiatives. Consequently, NATO supports or complements such initiatives as PSI and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) by making available training and educational programs and support for exercises.

² The EAPC includes the 28 NATO countries plus 22 partner countries. Mediterranean Dialogue countries include Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

Likewise, the Alliance also emphasizes the importance of the implementation of and compliance with the legal and normative basis for preventing the proliferation of WMD. These include, but are not limited to, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions such as UNSCR 1540 which, passed in 2004, legally requires nations to implement laws and enforcement mechanisms to prevent their territories to be used as a safe haven for terrorist and proliferation activities.

Concluding Thoughts

As this brief overview demonstrates and explains, NATO has over the last ten years built a number of robust capabilities to protect, prevent and recover from WMD proliferation and potential attacks. Its recently adopted Comprehensive Policy is a political mandate to do more but, despite efforts to raise the profile of the Alliance in this area and to develop more initiatives, the Alliance remains hamstrung with scarce resources. Nevertheless, we will continue to encourage all partners and others to fully implement and comply with non-proliferation legal norms, support global international non-proliferation initiatives such as PSI and GICNT, reach out to other international partners and organizations, and continue to develop the necessary capabilities to impede and stop the trafficking of WMD and related materials.

More clearly needs to be done. In recognition of that fact but given the “zero real growth environment” we currently must live in, the Alliance is, for example, currently in the planning phases of creating a non-proliferation trust fund that would support the goals of UNSCR 1540, PSI and other non-proliferation activities. Some projects that could be funded by a trust fund include the creation of a regional non-proliferation operations fusion centre and the deployment of mobile training teams for UNSCR 1540 compliance assistance.

As a multifaceted threat, we have recognized that WMD proliferation and terrorism cannot be addressed by NATO alone. The Alliance has acknowledged this aspect and is working to counter it by reaching out to its partners around the globe. By working with different actors, both nations and organizations alike, NATO is more than willing to join with nations, international and regional international organizations, non-governmental organizations and private industry to partner with and help build a network of networks that will eventually create an impenetrable web of proliferation denial for those who would seek such weapons of mass destruction.



NATO at 60: Transforming to Meet New Challenges

Richard L. PROSEN¹

Transformation

NATO has entered a challenging period of transformation in adapting not only to the realities of a changed Europe but also to those of a changing world. President Obama summarized the challenges facing NATO best by stating, “The same forces that have brought us close together have also given rise to new dangers that threaten to tear our world apart – dangers that cannot be contained by the nearest border or the furthest ocean.”² Challenges currently confronting NATO include terrorism, insurgency, regional conflicts, and humanitarian crises. At the same time there has been an increase in the pace and scope of global change as well as the emergence of new threats to our collective security, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, energy insecurity, and cyber attacks. NATO is taking bold steps to complete its transformation from a once static, reactive Alliance focused on territorial defense to an expeditionary, proactive global security provider. But much more work lies ahead. As the United States Ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder recently pointed out, “NATO at 60 needs to be a mature, flexible institution poised for a new era. The Alliance is at the epicenter of a changing dynamic in global security and politics – a dynamic newly marked by interconnectedness and international cooperation.”³ This paper offers a policy perspective on some of the most pressing legal and institutional challenges facing NATO today.

¹ The author is a Foreign Affairs Officer in the United States Department of State’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Office of European Security and Political Affairs. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Department of State or the United States government.

² President Barack Obama, remarks at a Town Hall Meeting during the NATO Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, Strasbourg, France, April 3, 2009.

³ Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO, *Agenda for a New World Order*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Forum on Transatlantic Relations, speech given in Berlin, July 1, 2009.

New NATO Strategic Concept

In order to modernize NATO's mission, Allies at the NATO Strasbourg-Kehl Summit (April 2009) agreed to update the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept, with the goal of having the document adopted at the NATO Lisbon Summit (November 2010). United States National Security Advisor General James Jones recently stated, "If common defense was NATO's *raison d'être* for the 20th century, common security should be its mantra for the 21st century." According to General Jones, NATO's next Strategic Concept should clearly outline NATO's role in countering asymmetric threats, including terrorism, violent extremism, WMD and missile proliferation, energy insecurity, illegal shipment of weapons, narco-terrorism, and cyber security.⁴

Afghanistan

Nowhere is NATO more visible or more vitally important than in Afghanistan. With more than 80,000 troops from 43 countries, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is the largest and most challenging operation in NATO's history. The main mission of ISAF is to support the Afghan government in the maintenance of security throughout the country, while helping to develop the Afghan National Security Forces through mentoring, training, and equipping. Our paramount objectives in Afghanistan are clear: we aim to disrupt, defeat, and dismantle Al Qaeda and the Taliban and ensure that Afghanistan is secure for the Afghan people. Specifically, our near-term goal is to reverse the Taliban's momentum over the next eighteen months. The international community has made an enormous commitment to our Afghan partners and success is essential.⁵ Consistent with the Obama Administration's diplomacy, development, and defense policy, the additional surge of United States resources – both military and civilian – is aimed at helping diminish violence and eliminating insurgent support, while creating space for economic and social development in Afghanistan, helping develop sustainable institutions, and empowering the country's leadership to facilitate the Afghans' capacity to secure and govern their country.

NATO faces several legal challenges with its ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Due in part to uncertainties related to security within Pakistan, NATO has taken several legal and political steps to open a supply distribution network through Central Asia into northern Afghanistan. At the NATO Bucharest Summit (April 2008), Russia offered to allow Allies to transport non-lethal goods overland to Afghanistan. In early 2009 the United States began to ship supplies to Afghanistan

⁴ General James Jones, National Security Advisor, *U.S. National Security: The Obama Approach*, remarks at an event hosted by the Atlantic Council, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Washington, DC, May 27, 2009. For a summary of NATO's approach to the development of the 2010 Strategic Concept, see www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html.

⁵ Note: On October 5, 2006, ISAF took command of all international security forces within Afghanistan. The U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission is also active within Afghanistan. ISAF, which operates under a United Nations mandate, is currently led by General Stanley McChrystal, United States Army, who commands both ISAF and OEF forces.

through Russia under this arrangement. The United States has also concluded bilateral transit agreements with the relevant Central Asian countries and NATO is working to finalize a similar set of agreements.

Another issue regarding the war in Afghanistan involves the insurgents that NATO forces pick up during the campaign. NATO has an arrangement with Afghanistan (based largely on European Court for Human Rights standards) that detainees can be held by ISAF forces for up to 96 hours before they must be turned over to Afghan authorities. The legal challenges to a developing country emerging from three decades of civil war are manifold. The lack of adequate criminal justice system resources, capacities and facilities complicates even the best attempts to administer Afghan law impartially in a wartime environment.

Counter-Piracy

Another critical NATO mission is its expanding role in helping to thwart pirate attacks near the Horn of Africa. NATO has a significant counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia and is currently working with the European Union and other international actors to reduce threats to the safe passage of commercial vessels in and around the Gulf of Aden. NATO's Operation Allied Protector, the European Union's Atalanta mission, and the multinational Combined Task Force-151 coordinate patrols and remain in close communication with United States Naval Forces Central Command military personnel in Bahrain to coordinate their efforts. Other nations' navies, such as those of Russia, India, Japan, and China, are also active in helping secure the region's sea lanes. Despite the vast expanse of water to be patrolled and the increase in the sophistication level of recent pirate attacks, NATO and other international actors have conducted several successful counter-piracy operations and continue to expand the international community's capacity to dissuade and prevent future pirate attacks.

The ensuing legal challenge for NATO begins with what to do with pirates captured off the Horn of Africa. Some countries involved with the naval operations possess domestic remedies to address the legal issues stemming from their participation in the various counter-piracy operations. However, the commercial ships that are targeted by pirates are often Panamanian- or Liberian-flagged vessels, owned by companies based in other countries, while operating with multinational crews, and carrying cargos that originated from multiple ports in different countries. The counter-piracy legal matters become rapidly complex. A key legal issue involves the transfer and prosecution of piracy suspects. United States policy is that the victim or affected states should prosecute the suspects in their domestic courts, or should work out international agreements with a country in the region (such as Kenya) with the capacity to permit them to do so under exceptional circumstances. NATO is currently looking into the issue of establishing a legal framework with Kenyan authorities. Faced with the mounting legal dilemmas, there have been cases where some captured pirates were stripped of their weapons and simply released in Puntland, free to return to their illicit activities the next day. Another legal issue facing NATO is that Allies have divergent

policies regarding whether offering a ransom is a viable option. The United States stands firmly against rewarding, with any form of compensation, those who brazenly defy international law, as it would likely foment future criminal activity.

21st Century NATO

During his campaign in 2008 President Obama declared that, “Now is the time to join together through constant cooperation, strong institutions, shared sacrifices, and a global commitment to progress to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”⁶ Responding to that vision, NATO has embarked on a far-reaching internal review exercise to modernize the way it conducts business. Reforming how NATO operates on a day-to-day basis is essential to help the Alliance succeed in its most critical missions and implement the new Strategic Concept. The current headquarters reform work underway aims to improve NATO’s decision-making processes, enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its institutional structures, and allocate resources optimally.

Catalyst for Change

Administrative changes, however important, can get us only so far without equally significant policy modifications. Since I handle the NATO counterterrorism portfolio for my office, let me suggest a few specific changes that Allies may consider to broaden and deepen NATO’s contribution to the fight against terrorism. In short, the Alliance should take a more comprehensive and programmatic approach to help counter violent extremism and radicalization.

As a values-based institution, transforming to meet 21st century security challenges, NATO has untapped potential to make a comprehensive contribution to the struggle against violent extremism. Specifically, I recommend that NATO develop a series of “smart power” public-private partnerships with non-traditional partners such as academics, civil society/non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international businesses in order to better address the non-military aspects of countering terrorism. For example, NATO’s Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), which is based in Norfolk, Virginia with the mandate “to enhance the Alliance’s interoperability, relevance, and effectiveness,”⁷ could demonstrate leadership by developing such partnerships aimed at improving the education and training requirements for NATO military authorities, its agencies, and academic institutions. France, which assumed the command of ACT in September 2010, could become an agent of change for NATO’s non-operational Strategic Command by promoting a series of forward-leaning new policies to combat terrorism utilizing an interdisciplinary approach. Moreover, NATO’s Center of Excellence in Ankara could add counter-radicalization components to its ongoing training programs and further expand and

⁶ President Barack Obama, *A World That Stands as One*, speech given in Berlin, Germany, July 24, 2008.

⁷ For more information on NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT), see www.act.nato.int, and for background on ACT’s Transformation Network, see transnet.act.nato.int/wise.

deepen its civil society and academic outreach and partnerships. NATO's Science for Peace and Security program should enhance its collaboration with leading scholars and mainstream religious leaders, seeking fresh perspectives and best practices in countering the ideological support for terrorism. The NATO-Russia Council could also make significant strides by fostering international efforts that build common ground and help positively influence the next generation of public opinion leaders. Moreover, NATO's public diplomacy division could take a more proactive stance against violent extremism and radicalization – similar to efforts undertaken by the United Kingdom's Research, Information and Communications Unit⁸ – and develop strategic communications engagement that employs new media technologies and outreach mechanisms. These suggestions are a representative subset of some of the practical steps NATO could undertake to help counter the motives, underlying conditions, and manifestations of violent extremism.

In an age in which individuals, money, and ideas move internationally with increasing ease, environments in which conditions that may be conducive to the emergence or spread of radicalization and violent extremism remain a concern, regardless of distance. In response, several countries, including the United States, have begun to work together with regional bodies and civil society organizations to support and help fund training and technical assistance aimed at promoting political participation, civil rights, the rule of law, and sustainable development in regions of concern throughout the world. A United Nations report released last year highlighted a number of counter-radicalization program areas (some of which might be considered for future NATO efforts), including:

- training and vetting agencies involved in implementing counterterrorism and counter-radicalization policies;
- developing youth education and Internet initiatives; and
- conducting outreach and rehabilitation programs.⁹

Meanwhile, there are several very successful partnership activities that have been established under NATO auspices, including the George C. Marshall Center's Partnership for Peace Consortium Counterterrorism Working Group and its Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism study.¹⁰ When the output of these public-private partnership efforts resonates in Brussels, Allied capitals, or regions where NATO conducts operations, the results help spur the

⁸ The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) is a counterterrorism strategic communications unit of the UK's Home Office with the goal of making a positive impact on counterterrorist communications, countering the impact of terrorist communications, and assisting the private sector. For more information, please visit: <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/about-the-directorate/RICU/index.html>.

⁹ United Nations Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force, *Report of the Radicalization and Extremism Working Group: Inventory of State Programs*. See <http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf>.

¹⁰ Dr. Sharyl Cross, George C. Marshall Center European Center for Security Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany), *Exploring Military Dimensions in Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism (CIST)*, May 14-16, 2008, Rome, Italy. For a summary of the efforts of the Partnership for Peace Consortium's Counterterrorism Working Group (led by Dr. Jay LeBeau), see <https://consortium.pims.org/ct-wg>.

Alliance's adaptation to the new security paradigm of an increasingly interconnected world facing polymorphous security threats.

Structural Adjustments

It has been suggested that the Alliance lacks a well-articulated counterterrorism strategy or organizational doctrine. In 2002, NATO established a Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF), but thus far the CTTF remains an internal headquarters coordination body meeting monthly to deconflict potentially overlapping counterterrorism activities. The United Nations, on the other hand, established its Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) in 2005 to ensure coordinated efforts across the UN system, and a UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy followed in 2006 to help institutionalize the CTITF's practical work. NATO should revitalize its CTTF and give it the mandate to produce a forward-looking review of NATO's institutional counterterrorism roles, functions, and contributions. This CTTF-led assessment would help shape the Alliance's approach in thwarting violent extremism and radicalization over the next decade.

NATO would benefit from a stock-taking exercise that examined its internal structures and capabilities relative to 21st century threats. Such an assessment would be consistent with the NATO Secretary General's institutional reform goals and may lead to, for example, the establishment of a new senior-level NATO headquarters post (perhaps a Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging/Asymmetric Security Challenges) to integrate and coordinate NATO's counterterrorism policies and efforts. NATO's hard power counterterrorism capability will remain a core competency for its battlefield commanders and forces in the field, but NATO headquarters needs to undertake radical institutional modifications for the Alliance to more effectively, efficiently, and comprehensively contribute to non-kinetic (i.e., diplomatic and development) counterterrorism efforts. NATO continues to serve a vital role in countering terrorism, but also requires additional resources to unleash its full potential across multiple hard and soft power security dimensions.

Conclusion

NATO's role and credibility as a global security provider in the post-Cold War era will be determined by how the Alliance performs against the full spectrum of security challenges that it faces. As Ambassador Daalder recently noted, "We live in extraordinary times. We're combating an economic crisis of historic proportions, fighting a war [in Afghanistan] four thousand miles away from the core of our Euro-Atlantic area, and confronting threats that will define the 21st century – threats like violent extremism, proliferation, insurgency, piracy, and cybercrime. Terrorists do not recognize territorial limits; pandemics know no borders; climate change does not stop at the polar ice caps; hackers are undeterred by local firewalls."¹¹ The response must be to modernize, empower,

¹¹ Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO, *A Full and Urgent Agenda for NATO in the 21st Century*, Security & Defense Agenda, speech given in Brussels, Belgium, June 8, 2009.

and resource NATO so that it is able to address the threats we face today, while remaining prepared for tomorrow's uncertainties. Former SACEUR General Craddock once observed, "Our opponents in Afghanistan operate and sustain their opposition within the gap that exists between the forces and capabilities that we have and need."¹² In the same vein, as NATO transforms to address modern security challenges, Allies and partners must redouble their collective efforts to close the gap between the structures and resources that we currently have and need.

¹² General Bantz J. Craddock, United States Army, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, *Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, March 11, 2008.



Just War and Resistance: A Contradiction in Terms?

William J. OLSON^{1,2}

Inter arma enim silent leges
Cicero
(*In times of war, the law falls silent*)

When is war just? Not an easy question to answer but a great deal of ink, not to say blood, has been spilled in trying to determine a workable, acceptable reply. The current international system is, in part, the result of theoretical and practical efforts to answer that question or to manage the consequences of the answer or the failure to do so.

Not to put too fine a point on it, the origin of all so-called nation-states lies in war and a history of violence. The international system itself, growing in part from the Peace of Westphalia, is a product of centuries of conflict and various efforts to modulate the hows, whys, and wherefores of war. By contrast, there is no corresponding theory of Just Peace, with a complex theoretical and practical concordance as the basis for international law, such as it is. A further gap exists within the concept of Just War itself: there is no adequate theory and practice of Just Resistance. Nor does there appear to be any workable program to arrive at one, hence the perpetual question that troubles all thinking on the subject: is one man's terrorist another's freedom fighter?

The deep, philosophical problem at the heart of Just War theory is that it is not simply an analytical assessment but also a normative practice that purports to derive an ought from an is. The goal is not merely to describe war but to create a system for regulating it, the justification for the latter not being derivable from the former. It is, furthermore, a product of the efforts of people—states—with a stake in the answer, thus states acting as judges in their own cause, hardly a model of impartiality, which is also a problem.

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² The views expressed here are entirely my own and do not reflect the views of NDU, the Department of Defense, or any other USG agency.

This was less important at one time when the issue of war was largely a matter of the conflict between states. Some 360 years into various attempts to create a system to restrain interstate conflict, subjecting it to some form of regulation despite lapses and failures, a more or less coherent set of principles has emerged to make war between states rule governed. But the nature of modern war, or better, post-modern war, has a reality not captured by this history and not subject to its logic.

There is an immediate tension, not to say contradiction, when one comes to try to apply Just War theory—*jus in bello* or *jus ad bellum*—to the idea and environment of resistance. Central to a species of Enlightenment ideas and to the American Revolution, and incorporated into interpretations of international relations theory and practice, is the notion of the right to resist, the right of revolution. While this is fairly clear and straightforward, after this point everything related to the idea becomes fuzzy very quickly.

Competent Authority

The first problem arises in consideration of competent authority to declare war and lay claim to the just cause supporting it. The concept of competent authority is central to Just War theory and is based on the existence of some recognized, recognizable, and somehow formally constituted structure or entity that can claim authority, or the legitimacy necessary to sustain the claim of authority. Accompanying this is the idea of enforcement, that there exists some means to punish violations of the rules. In the modern context, a state or, as the representative of states, the United Nations are the putative sole authorities, within the context of certain established rules, capable of declaring war and blessing its causes and means as just or not and of enforcing sanctions against violations. This is the result of that 360-plus years of painful evolution noted above. But if one subscribes to resistance theory—the putative right of people (however defined) to revolution—where does the authority to declare war and claim a just cause lie?

To take two examples from an earlier period, the American and French revolutions present the problem with enough perspective distance to allow for some judgment. Both revolutions asserted the right to resistance; indeed, the American Declaration of Independence is one of the first major political statements and intellectual justifications—based on a considerable philosophical evolution from Thomas Aquinas to John Locke—for such a right, subsequently established by force of arms with the success of American resistance. Similarly, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in the first year of what would become the French Revolution adopts very similar themes, enjoying not only the same ideational heritage of Enlightenment thought as that which influenced the Americans, but also was proposed by the Marquis de Lafayette, a witness to and participant in the earlier American effort. But these earlier claims to the right of resistance are interesting in that, one can argue, they were able to claim something that most modern resistance efforts lack, namely competent authority.

In the American case, the individual colonies had almost 160 years of local self-rule built around chartered colonial governments. These separate institutions summoned a national assembly, the Continental Congress, to deliberate on what was perceived as threats to local self-government and established rights. Meeting first in 1774 and again in 1775. It was this body, nominated by the chartered colonial governments—although in defiance of the British Crown—that deliberated on and then declared American independence, putting forward the justifications not only for independence but the argument for the right of any people oppressed by their government to follow a similar course. The success of the revolution was also success for the idea of self-determination and the right to resistance. But it was based on a clear chain of established rights exercised through competent authority, a point often lost in translation.

Similarly, the initial phase of what became the French Revolution grew out of the Crown's summoning of the Estates General to help solve a fiscal crisis. In organizing itself, the Estates became the National Assembly, that assembly took its charter to meet to move beyond the original intent and used the occasion to try to rewrite the French constitution—which, though not written as such, was assumed to exist based on Enlightenment arguments about the nature of government. But the process unleashed a host of more radical sentiments that had been bubbling below the surface and both Crown and the Estates General were overwhelmed by mobs and radical movements that seized power and launched a campaign of terror to eliminate opposition. Thus, the French Revolution. As such, the original effort, one can argue, was based on competent authority. Thereafter, as events spiraled into radical rage, it is less clear that such an authority existed except as a freestanding claim available to anyone with a grievance or cause.

In most modern cases of resistance, however, there is no 'competent' authority, certainly not at the beginning, and no means to define such an authority that has any chance of general acceptance. At least there is no competent authority unless one claims, as do Marxists, that the tides of inexorable history itself empower those who represent those tides to force a change of government. Or some similar ideological movement that bases its claims on representing an imperative that in and of itself legitimizes resistance, therefore needing no mechanism or justification beyond its own validation. Some 'authority' or someone claiming it may arise to lead resistance, but even should such emerge, how does it derive the authority to make decisions about war, much less justify it? Without such authority or the possibility of it, why is anyone with any claim not justified in declaring and waging war—resistance—by whatever means they believe will achieve success, the justification being provided by the act itself, especially should it win. Might makes right. Ends justifying means.

Conversely, how can any claim to resist be justified at all? The 360-plus years of evolving theory noted above is no help in arriving at an answer in this context. It appears that the essence of resistance theory resists theory, that it is not and cannot be rule governed, that it is the essence of chaos with no theoretical coherence apart from the will, ambitions, and goals of those who would resist and the means that they choose. Indeed, when Cicero wrote the above quote, he had in mind the chaos on Rome's streets raised by criminal gangs and their patrons that made life unsafe, although it also reflected one strand of thought that holds that war itself cannot be governed by

rules, a view currently rejected but often in the breach. Many do not accept that war is or should be governed by rules. This is even more the case in the current context where many of the groups claiming the right to resist reject the authority of the current international system and its concepts of Just War, challenging its very legitimacy to provide answers, shape rules, or enforce its will. That system itself is the subject of resistance, along with its rules and practices.

There are three possible answers to the question of how any claim to resist can be justified: It cannot; It can; It does not need to.

It Cannot

A counsel of despair. Given the multiple sources from which resistance may arise, and the plethora of resistance efforts currently underway, with a host of claims justifying them, no theory can hope to accommodate them, and no practical means is available to encompass them. The reality of this is revealed in part by the inability to arrive at a universally accepted definition of terrorism or who rightly deserves to be labeled a terrorist. The most common element in such a definition—as close as it comes to consensus delineation—is agreement that it involves indiscriminate but purposeful violence aimed at non-combatants and that this is abhorrent and unlawful. But this is the judgment, the voice, of a consensus among the members—states and elements of the existing international system—of what might be called the Just War order. And it is also a definition that focuses on means and therefore does not address the question of the legitimacy of the cause itself, regardless of means.

The problem is, many of the groups now claiming the right to resist are in opposition to the current international system and the order, any order, that it represents not just to individual states in that system. Resistance challenges the legitimacy of that order itself and therefore its challenge exists outside the rules and regulations that would try to define justice in the case and regulate practice. But even groups that do not challenge the order itself cannot be accommodated within the existing framework, if for no other reason than they are not subject to a meaningful system of checks and balances designed to deal with state actors not non-state actors. There is no United Nations for Resistance Movements, and international law is largely formless or at odds with itself—largely because the international community is sharply divided on the issues involved—in trying to respond. For confirmation on this point, ask any state currently dealing with a significant internal resistance movement how they have fared at the hands of the international system as currently structured. Even if it were not, what sanctions or enforcement mechanisms exist that would be persuasive to groups in resistance? Given the host of mechanisms—illegal markets, criminal organizations, money laundering schemes, borderless cyber environments, smuggling systems—that are available to such groups, all beyond control, there is no system for enforcement up to the job. It is a situation of hopeless incoherence.

It Can

A counsel of optimism. While the current environment encompasses a good deal of incoherence, the situation is too serious to despair. It is not hopeless just complicated and not subject to neat solutions or conceptualizations. The effort to develop a Just War order was not the result of some universal law giver stepping forth to deliver, *ex cathedra*, the authoritative definition and guidelines. These evolved in a painful process with fits and starts, successes and failures. The lesson here is that figuring out how to accommodate or incorporate ideas for justifying resistance will involve similar struggle; that, in fact, that struggle is well underway and that consensus is possible if not currently manifest. The outlines of that consensus lie in a growing agreement on what constitutes legitimate governance. The question of a right to resist is not derive from a theory of Just War, which in part is based on the legitimacy of a just authority, but from ideas of what, in fact, constitute the basis of authority itself, what legitimizes it, whether to declare and wage war or to make decisions affecting the lives and livelihoods of common folk.

Part of the evolution of the international system that influenced the development of Just War theory has been a movement away from a system that regarded governments as legitimate because they were the government, in spite of how that came about or was managed, to more of an environment that judges the right of a government to govern based on an emerging set of norms grounded in individual human rights. While incomplete and still evolving, a consensus is discernible in what characteristics a government must have in order to be legitimate. Based on that, there is set of emerging criteria that can help in evaluating the justice of any claim to resist an existing government and the steps necessary to force changes in government or in supporting it against illegitimate resistance. It is a situation of incoherent hopefulness.

It Does Not Need To

A counsel of indifference. There are now two worlds involved in answering the question. This is not a divide between developed and developing countries but between state and non-state actors. The former, the world of state actors, is fairly well known and has a long history and body of theory, practice, and law associated with its development as the central fact of a globalized world. The second world is more problematic. Composed of many, disparate elements—international banking and business, non-government organizations, terrorist and insurgent groups, criminal organizations and gangs, pirates, cybernauts, and plain, lone-wolf crazies—this environment is truly chaotic in a way that used to characterize the international situation before the emergence of states and the slow evolution of the current international system.

While that system retains many characteristics of a chaotic environment—in the sense that no single authority exists that can make binding rules for the whole—history and tradition have created a series of *modus vivendi*, roughly accepted rules of the road, that constrain if they do not bind the various players in the system. Although complex and often messy, it still has borders, practices, laws or law-like elements, institutions, traditions, and a shared history of effort and

cooperation to give it coherence. It is chaos with rules. The second, parallel, world is not nearly so neat.

Many of the actors in the second world have little or nothing in common with each other, although there is some overlap. Bankers and businesses, for example, have no interests in common with drug traffickers, terrorists, and criminal gangs, but the former are essential to the latter for money laundering. Corruption is another link that binds or creates overlap, elements in the second world needing facilities and capabilities, or a blind eye, in the first world to operate. Some of the players in this second world, again bankers and businesses, are contributors to the first, again for the facilities and capabilities that they provide to support global networks of connectivity and interdependence. Governments, too, have a foot in this second world, often intelligence and police forces dabbling for good or ill. But apart from this largely utilitarian overlap, many of the non-state actors are at war with the international system as it now exists. They reject its premises, its architecture, and its authority. While they may have only vague notions of what to put in its place, enmity is deep and irreconcilable and they are possessed of the intention to destroy the system and erect something else in its place. The loosely organized opposition of various groups to the World Trade Organization or the whole structure of international finance is only one visible feature of this environment of hostility that demands action.

Many terrorist organizations, what might be called global insurgent movements, and an indistinct group of lone-wolves empowered by modern technology in unprecedented ways are another matter. These elements of this second world are devoted to destroying not just individual governments or countries but the current international order itself. They do not seek reform. They aim to rewrite the terms of history as such. For these actors, questions of Just War are part and parcel of a reality to be rejected and fundamentally changed. For such groups their cause is their justification. War is total and any means are acceptable. There is no appeal to standards outside this claim. It is a situation of utter denial.

Implications

If the above description of the division of the world into irreconcilable warring camps with opposing views on the very nature of the justifications for war and for employing means in war approximates reality, then there is no basis for accommodation or reconciliation.

If, as has often been noted, nation-states themselves are unraveling and are increasingly unable to govern themselves and therefore are progressively disabled from sustaining a viable international system, then the scope for action for a host of non-state actors with a contrary agenda correspondingly expands and such groups are in a position to exert greater influence if not actually able to replace a failing system with a newer one; and states and the international system are conversely less able to respond, or such responses fall disproportionately on a shrinking number of states that retain the power to act.

If the health of the international system, constructed as it has evolved on a foundation of sovereign states, is based on the health and viability of those sovereign states, then an environment in which forces are at work undermining those states is yielding a result that is increasingly unlikely or unable to defend the principles upon which that system is based and upon which international law and ideas of Just War are derived.

If true, then the failure to find a means to accommodate the idea of a right to resist into any framework that can justify or subject it to rules means the equivalent of a black hole at the heart of the galaxy of international relations and law likely to swallow light, constellations, and order. It means an environment in which the long, painful process that has produced, however clumsily, the present international order and set of rules is up for renegotiation with players who have no stake in the present system and who seek its destruction. That they have only the vaguest notions of what to put in its place is another element in the chaos that threatens to overwhelm what prospects there are for any sort of enduring peace or just order, locally, regionally, or internationally.



Turkey and New NATO

Richard WEITZ¹

In May 2010, the group of experts assisting with the drafting of NATO’s new Strategic Concept issued their final report, entitled “NATO 2020: Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement.” This document recommended how the Concept should define the purpose, nature, and fundamental security tasks of the alliance given contemporary and future security environment. The authors stress NATO’s need to develop new partnerships—such as with Russia, Central Asia, and the European Union—and to address the novel security challenges relating to nuclear nonproliferation, missile defense, and Afghanistan. Turkey will play an important role with respect to these and many other issues.

The collective impact of these areas became clear in May 2010, when a joint diplomatic initiative by Prime Minister of Turkey and President of Brazil intended to help resolve the protracted dispute over Iran’s nuclear program further alienated Turkey from the alliance. Months of painstaking mediation efforts appeared to achieve results when they announced a breakthrough agreement in Tehran on May 17. In their declaration, the three governments confirmed Iran’s willingness to “deposit” 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium in Turkey. In return, Iran would receive 120 kilograms of more uranium fuel enriched to a higher level as required to fuel Tehran’s medical research reactor. Prime Minister of Turkey and President of Brazil have argued that the trilateral deal is sufficiently promising that further sanctions, at least in the near term, are unnecessary. Even so, while expressing appreciation for their efforts, only one day later the permanent members of the UN Security Council reached preliminary agreement on the content of another resolution imposing sanctions on Iran for its suspicious nuclear activities.

The trilateral declaration, which has been detailed in a subsequent submission by the Iranian government to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), differs in certain critical respects from the deal proposed to Iran by several NATO countries and their partners, but not Turkey and Brazil, at Vienna last year. It still foresees Iran’s removing the same amount of LEU (1,200 kilograms)

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from its territory, but under the terms of the trilateral agreement, the LEU would be relocated to Turkey, which lacks its uranium enrichment capabilities. Another country would therefore either have to enrich the Iranian LEU further or provide the 19.75 enriched uranium from another source. Whether Iran can reclaim the deposited LEU is uncertain, though the language of the agreement makes clear that Iran retains ownership of the LEU even when it is in Turkey. In addition, whereas the Vienna Group sought to secure a suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment activities as part of the deal, the trilateral declaration explicitly affirms Tehran's right to research, develop, manufacture, and use all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment. Following the declaration, the Iranian government affirmed that it would continue to enrich uranium to the 20 percent level. Another problem is that, as a result of the time that has elapsed since last October, Iran has continued to enrich much more uranium, making the 1,200 kilograms of LEU Iran would exchange under the new trilateral proposal a much smaller share of its total stockpile. While Iran possessed approximately 1,500 kilograms of LEU last October, now its LEU stockpile has grown to about 2,300 kilograms. As a result, even if the Iran-Turkey exchange occurs, Iran would possess, or soon acquire, sufficient LEU to make a nuclear bomb assuming that Iran would enrich its remaining LEU further to weapons-grade levels. The immediate motive behind Tehran's acceptance of the trilateral agreement was its aim to avoid new sanctions. Until recently, Iranian officials had evaded Turkish proposals to mediate the dispute, including an attempt by Ankara last year to allow the proposed nuclear fuel exchange to proceed on its territory. Even in late April, the Iranian Foreign Ministry had continued to insist that any exchange occur within Iran.

The trilateral incident has highlighted major differences between the perspectives of Turkey and the views of many of its NATO partners regarding not only Iran, but the international nuclear order on the whole. The United States, Britain, and France remain adamant that Iran must cease enriching uranium or engaging in other sensitive nuclear activities until Tehran convinces the international community that its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes. Any country that can enrich uranium on an industrial scale, which could be used to manufacture fuel for a nuclear power program, could also probably produce the weapons-grade fissile material needed to power a nuclear weapon. The barrier between making commercial reactor fuel (enriched to the level of 3.5 percent) and manufacturing weapons-grade uranium (enriched to 90 percent), largely depends on time and engineering, not physics. Concerns that the Iranian government is striving to acquire the ability to make nuclear bombs under the guise of pursuing peaceful nuclear activities has led the IAEA and the UN Security Council to adopt various resolutions calling on Tehran to alter its policies. Western governments insist that Tehran comply with longstanding IAEA demands to disclose more data about the military nature of Iran's past, present, and planned future nuclear activities. Doubts about Iran's peaceful intentions have already led the Council to adopt three resolutions imposing various sanctions on Iranian nationals and institutions that engage in suspicious activities.

While Iran has declared to the IAEA its nuclear enrichment activities at its main facilities at Natanz, and has placed them under standard international safeguards, suspicions endure that the Iranian government will produce a weapon using highly enriched uranium manufactured at a

clandestine site that is not under IAEA supervision. In order to prevent such a development and increase the transparency of Iran's nuclear activities, Western governments want Tehran to accede to the IAEA Additional Protocol, which empowers agency personnel to monitor and inspect even undeclared facilities where covert nuclear activities might be occurring. The Iranian government voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol from October 2003 until mid-October 2005, but has since ceased complying. Iranians claim that the Central Intelligence Agency and foreign intelligence services exploited the IAEA inspections to collect information about Iran's non-nuclear activities.

Turkish officials have argued that the best method to prevent Iranians from seeking nuclear weapons is to address their underlying sources of their insecurity. Rather than rely on threats and sanctions, Turkish policy makers want to offer Iran security pledges in return for reciprocal guarantees that Tehran will not use its nuclear activities for military purposes. In addition to issues directly related to Iran, Turkey and Brazil have long objected to key dimensions of the global nuclear order. Turkish and Brazilian officials decry the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for legitimizing a discriminatory hierarchy that privileges certain countries by legally allowing them to keep their nuclear weapons, perhaps indefinitely, as well as by enforcing restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. The two governments also object to the unrepresentative nature of the bodies that enforce the Treaty, especially the UN Security Council, which includes a small percentage of the world's nation states and gives only five countries—precisely those the NPT recognizes as nuclear-weapons states—veto power over actions aimed at enforcing the NPT and other nonproliferation agreements. The Turkish government insists that any country should have the right to engage in all civilian nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment and the other phases of the cycle needed to produce nuclear fuel, provided that state applies traditional IAEA safeguards and complies with other nonproliferation standards. Furthermore, Turkish officials attack the alleged hypocrisy of Western governments in approaching nonproliferation issues. They note that these countries have repeatedly sought to sanction Iran despite its adoption of the NPT and the lack of conclusive evidence that Iranians are actively pursuing nuclear weapons. In contrast, Western leaders make only rhetorical efforts to persuade Israel to accede to the NPT and eliminate its widely suspected nuclear weapons stockpile. The Turkish government strongly supports transforming the entire Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Ironically, Turkey is commonly thought to have dozens of American tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on its territory at the Incirlik Air Base. Although NATO countries refuse to discuss the location and numbers of their nuclear weapons in public, Turkey is widely considered to still host U.S. nuclear weapons within the alliance's "nuclear-sharing" framework. This arrangement allows member states not having nuclear weapons to "share" U.S.-provided nuclear bombs that they can theoretically deliver on their own (primarily by using fighter bombers). In principle, it empowers more NATO member countries to participate in the alliance's planning and possible use of nuclear weapons if they so choose. In peacetime, American soldiers stationed at their storage sites—specially constructed vaults on certain airfields—keep the weapons under tight control, while host-nation

pilots train with dummy warheads. In wartime, the American president can authorize the weapons' release, as well as the codes for detonating them, to the host-nation's military command.

Influential members of the Turkish national security establishment are widely suspected of resisting proposals to relinquish these TNWs. Since only four other NATO members still host U.S. TNW under NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangement, and three of them (but not the governments of Turkey or Italy) have indicated they would like to remove them as soon as possible, this situation has complicated efforts to agree on a NATO-wide policy with respect to TNWs. The April 2010 informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn discussed this issue, in preparation for a final decision at the NATO heads-of-state summit in Lisbon scheduled for this November. Papering over disagreements, the ministers at Tallin specified several "clear themes" that they agreed would guide their approach toward the TNW issue:

- NATO would maintain nuclear weapons as long as any existed
- Member states would not make unilateral decisions regarding NATO's TNW
- The allies would share the burdens of ensuring a safe and credible nuclear deterrent
- NATO would balance the need for a credible nuclear deterrent with making progress on arms control and disarmament issues
- The allied governments must take Russia's much larger TNW stockpile into account when determining NATO's TNW policies

Ideally, many NATO governments want to work with NATO to reduce mutual TNW holdings and ensure that any nuclear weapons they did keep more safe, secure, and transparent.

According to the available information, unlike the other four European countries hosting U.S. TNW, the Turkish Air Force reportedly is not presently certified to conduct nuclear missions, which have purchased aircraft capable of dropping U.S. nuclear-armed gravity bombs. The Turkish government also does not normally authorize U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers to deploy at Incirlik Air Base. As a result, the only way these weapons could be used in a crisis is if the United States or other NATO countries send nuclear-capable bombers to Turkey, where they could be loaded with the bombs. These factors significantly reduce the weapons' value as prompt credible deterrents. In practice, neither Turkish nor NATO planners seem especially concerned by this situation since the main purpose of the U.S. nuclear bombs in Turkey is not for operational use. Instead, the weapons help to symbolize the alliance's commitment to Turkey's defense, underscore the special security relationship between Washington and Ankara, and elevate Turkey's status within NATO and European security deliberations.

Attempting to withdraw the nuclear weapons from Turkey without the support of its government and the Turkish national security establishment could generate major problems. Many Turkish policy makers already doubt the credibility of NATO security commitments due to

several earlier incidents following the end of the shared Soviet threat. Notably, before both recent wars against Iraq, some European governments displayed obvious reluctance to use their own militaries to protect Turkey from Iraqi missile strikes. Although the United States did offer some protection, the Turkish government and people were unenthusiastic about their forced involvement in wars with a neighboring country. They feared becoming victims of Iraqi retaliation, suffering economic losses, and the increased potential for regional instability no matter what the conflicts' outcome. Washington's subsequent support for increasing Iraqi Kurds' autonomy within Iraq exacerbated Turkish worries about similar aspirations spreading among Turkey's Kurdish origin citizens. Turkish security experts have long been disappointed by the reluctance of fellow NATO members to assist Turkey's counterterrorist operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or to defend the Turkish people in northern Cyprus. Removing the TNWs at Incirlik without Ankara's approval might also prompt Turkey to develop its own nuclear deterrent, especially if Iran proceeds to develop a nuclear weapons capacity. Some Turkish officials see having physical access to NATO TNWs as compensating for Ankara's not developing an independent Turkish nuclear arsenal. Should NATO leaders decide to reduce substantially or eliminate the alliance's TNWs, they must assure Ankara that Turkey will still exert great influence on NATO's security policies. Insofar as some members of Turkey's security community are still concerned by Russia's nearby nuclear and conventional security forces, then NATO initiatives aimed at linking any withdrawal of U.S. TNW from Turkey with changes in Russian military policies would presumably be welcome in Ankara. The recently negotiated New START Treaty does not address TNWs, but the Obama administration has indicated that it plans to address the issue in the next round of bilateral nuclear negotiations with Russia. In addition, multinational negotiations between Russia and NATO might occur. In either case, Turkish policy makers should participate in the talks in some capacity.

NATO leaders might also seek to secure Ankara's support for reducing its TNWs by offering Turkey enhanced ballistic missile defense (BMD) protection. The Obama administration's revised European BMD implementation plans already envisage deploying U.S. missile defenses more rapidly and more closely to Turkish territory, which should help assuage Ankara's concerns. In any case, Turkey has already assumed a pivotal role in Europe's future missile defense BMD architecture. In recent years, U.S. officials have been lobbying Ankara to participate in its program within a NATO framework, while Iran and Russia have encouraged Turkey to keep its distance from Washington's BMD plans. Turkish policy makers have tried to balance these competing forces, while simultaneously leveraging them to advance Ankara's own regional security interests. First, they have sought to defend Turkey against possible missile threats. Second, they have aimed to highlight Turkey's value as a NATO and U.S. ally by supporting their BMD initiatives. Third, Turkish leaders have sought to avoid antagonizing Russia or Iran, whose governments have expressed opposition to NATO and U.S. missile defense programs located in their proximity.

Turkish policy makers, like other NATO governments, are eager to protect their national territories from ballistic missile threats. Turkish government representatives publicly downplay

concerns about Iran's progress in developing missile technologies, but at least some members of Turkey's national security establishment have expressed unease about Iran's growing military capabilities. Iran's Shahab-3, a missile derived from the North Korean Nodong that has a maximum range of about 1,500km when carrying a warhead of less than one tonne, cannot reach targets in southeastern Europe, but it can hit targets in the Middle East, including Israel, and Turkey.

Turkish officials became concerned in 2006 and 2007, when NATO appeared to have started constructing a missile defense architecture, based on the U.S. BMD systems planned for Poland and the Czech Republic, which would not soon extend to shield Turkey and other southeast European countries from missile strikes. At the time, the BMD assets envisaged for Poland and the Czech Republic would have lacked the technical capabilities to identify, track, and intercept ballistic missiles launched from Iran toward Turkey or fellow NATO allies Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. After the governments of these countries protested their exclusion, the June 2007 NATO Defense Ministers' meeting commissioned a study of how to integrate the U.S. and NATO BMD initiatives to ensure coverage of Turkey and other southeastern European NATO members by using short-range NATO BMD systems under development as a "bolt-on" to the longer-range U.S. BMD systems planned for Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition to technical considerations, the NATO governments had to address the funding issues associated with a BMD extension that would benefit only the few NATO members situated near Iran.

The decision last September by the Obama administration to deploy shorter-range interceptors and a variety of radar systems closer to Iran should help resolve some Turkish concerns about NATO's emerging BMD architecture. The new U.S. plans will protect Turkish territory more effectively, while the heightened U.S. funding commitment increases the likelihood that the system will be established despite the lukewarm attitude of some NATO governments toward paying for BMD. Yet, the new American focus on deploying BMD systems in southeast Europe makes it more difficult for Turkish policy makers to evade Russian and Iranian objections to NATO's BMD initiatives. Under its "phased adaptive approach," the Obama administration, like the previous Bush administration, intends to deploy more effective U.S. BMD systems in Europe over time as missile defense technology improves and as Iran continues to develop more effective offensive missiles. Turkish officials would prefer not to antagonize Iran and Russia, Turkey's two largest suppliers of oil and gas, while supporting U.S. or NATO BMD systems. Since the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated as AKP) assumed office in 2002, it has sought to improve ties with Tehran and Moscow. Iranian policy makers would naturally see any Turkish-based NATO BMD system as directed against them, which could weaken Turkey's preferred role as mediator between Iran and the West. If Iranian officials feared a Western attack or ever planned to launch Iran's long-range missiles in a war, they would likely attempt to destroy or at least disable any BMD facilities located in Turkey beforehand. Meanwhile, Russian strategists worry that improvements in U.S. and NATO BMD systems could also threaten Russia's long-range nuclear-armed missiles. They will presumably pressure Turkey to limit its support for these deployments.

Another unresolved issue is how the new U.S. BMD plans will affect Turkey's independent BMD capacity. When Turkish officials announced in September 2009 that they would spend at least one billion dollars to construct a national BMD architecture, they did not indicate how the new Turkish systems would relate to U.S. and NATO missile defense. Turkish policy makers are considering buying missile defense systems from Chinese, Russian, West European, and U.S. companies. They have insisted that their national missile defense programs are not aimed at countering a specific foreign threat, though Turkish concerns about Iran and Greece are obvious. Even the Obama administration's redesigned BMD architecture for Europe will not have the capability to defend Turkey's territory near the country's 500-kilometer border with Iran from nearby Iranian missiles due to their very short flight time. And NATO governments would presumably not automatically provide military assistance to Ankara in any Greece-Turkey war.

Turkey's BMD dilemmas would likely decrease if NATO and Russia established a joint BMD architecture, or at least agreed to collaborate sufficiently on missile defense to enable Turkey to contribute to a NATO system without antagonizing Russia. A few days before Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Washington on December 7, 2009, Vladimir Ivanovskiy, Russia's ambassador to Turkey, stated his government would support Turkey's hosting U.S. BMD systems if Ankara, Moscow, and Washington partnered on the project. An alternative proposal, first made by then Russian President Vladimir Putin at the June 2007 G-8 summit, is for Russia and the United States to jointly use the Russian-leased early warning radar located at Gabala in Azerbaijan, a close Turkish ally, to monitor Iranian missile developments. Azerbaijani authorities have seemed receptive to the proposal, which if implemented would not oblige Turkey to host a joint Russia-U.S. BMD site itself. Although the operational value of a jointly managed Russian-American base is uncertain given the probable reluctance of either country to share sensitive BMD data with the other, a Russian-American agreement regarding the radar might provide Turkey with sufficient diplomatic cover to avoid having to antagonize NATO or Russia.

Despite Ankara's unease with Moscow's policies toward Chechnya, Armenia, and Georgia, as well as concern over Russia's recent military resurgence, many Turkish leaders no longer perceive Russia as an imminent military threat to Turkey. Since Putin became president at the end of 1999, Russian leaders have cultivated relations with Ankara. Russia became Turkey's largest trading partner in 2008, while Turkey now ranks as Russia's seventh largest partner. Russia currently supplies almost two thirds of Turkey's natural gas consumption (which provides most of Turkey's electricity) and one fifth of its domestic oil needs. Thanks to Turkey's growing consumption of Russian energy, bilateral commerce peaked at some \$33.8 billion in 2008. Although this figure declined in 2009 due to the worldwide recession, decreases in the world prices for Russian oil and gas, and the contraction in international commerce, influential Turkish and Russian business leaders have developed a strong interest in preserving good bilateral relations.

One reason why many Turks have seen Russia as a more attractive partner has been Turkey's growing alienation from its traditional West European security allies. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's security managers have become concerned about becoming isolated within the

emerging European security architecture, in which the European Union (EU), which has declined to admit Turkey, has assumed a more prominent role. Turkey's exclusion from EU decision-making structures means that Ankara exerts little impact on EU policies that could affect its core security concerns. Turkish decision makers also worry about the EU's lack of will and ability to defend the country. Despite some recent progress, the EU has yet to develop the more robust military assets available to NATO, which includes the U.S. armed forces. Despite Turkey's extensive support for EU-led operations, Turkey policy makers argue that the EU has failed to fulfill its commitment to allow Ankara to participate in its security decisions. Instead, the EU members typically decide policies independently, and then invite Ankara to support policies that Turkey had no opportunity to shape.

Since 2007, 21 countries have been members of both NATO and the EU. Since both institutions operate by consensus when making important security decisions, those states that have membership in one organization but not the other enjoy great influence in shaping the level of cooperation between the two institutions. At present, NATO members Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States are not EU members, while the traditionally neutral or non-aligned EU members Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not NATO members, though four of the five (but still not Cyprus) have joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which allows for institutionalize collaboration between members and partners in support of NATO goals. As a result, cooperation between the EU and NATO has in turn been hampered by the Turkish-Cypriot dispute. Turkish objections to sharing sensitive NATO military information with Cyprus have limited formal NATO-EU intelligence sharing since 2004, when Cyprus joined the EU. The Cypriot government has retaliated by blocking Turkey's participation in certain EU defense activities. These mutual antagonisms have disrupted past NATO-EU collaboration and enable Turkey to deny NATO collective assets for any future EU-led mission.

Both NATO and the EU have been fortunate in that their dispute has not impeded Turkey's important contribution to establishing peace and security in Afghanistan. Turkey's military contributions have been channeled through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Turkey has twice led ISAF as well as various ISAF regional commands. Turkey presently contributes some 1,800 troops in Afghanistan. They help train members of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police as support ANSF development. At the same time, several factors have constrained Turkey's engagement in Afghanistan. These include a concern about becoming bogged down in an unwinnable war, alienation for U.S. policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and fears of antagonizing fellow Muslims by appearing to join a Western (Christian) crusade. These concerns, manifested in low popular support for Turkish participation in the war, have made the Turkish government cautious about its level of involvement, especially in the military realm. Turkish forces have thus far shunned direct participation in counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations. Conversely, Turkish officials have launched several diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing the underlying causes of the Afghan conflict, such as the tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since 2007, Turkey has hosted annual trilateral summit meetings

involving Afghan, Pakistani, and Turkish representatives, including the presidents and senior intelligence and military officers from each country. The most recent meeting on January 25, 2010, adopted programs to support the reconciliation and reintegration of Taliban members who agree to lay down their arms. The participants also discussed collaborating on health, education, and other socioeconomic projects.

In certain respects, NATO and Turkey are natural partners in Afghanistan. Turkey has unique cultural and geographic assets in this regard. It is one of the two NATO countries having a Muslim-majority population (together with Albania), a valuable attribute for a Western-led military operation in a Muslim-majority country (Afghanistan) and region (Central Asia). Turkey's location is also pivotal since Afghanistan, unlike the former Yugoslavia, is very much "out-of-area" for a transatlantic alliance. Turkish military facilities, especially İncirlik Base, have helped sustain NATO logistics in Afghanistan. For their part, Ankara's strong support for the Afghan mission helps underscore Turkey's contribution to European security. Insofar as both NATO and the EU expect to remain present in Eurasia for years to come, they all benefit from Turkey's strong regional profile and reputation, providing it can be harmonized with the security objectives of the non-regional powers.



Terrorism: The Westphalian Response and NATO

Edward MARKS¹

“The art of diplomacy is not to outsmart the other side, but to convince it either of common interests or of penalties if an impasse continues.”
Henry Kissinger

Terrorism has been with us for all of recorded history. It has often attracted inordinate attention but present-day practitioners have introduced a new scale of violence that threatens not only specific national governments but also the stability of the international state system. We are no longer dealing with 1970’s style “boutique” terrorism but instead facing insurgent campaigns by organized groups for specific political goals. Our current, and quite understandable, preoccupation with terrorist acts has somewhat obscured the fact that terrorism has become the tactic of choice of national and international insurgencies in today’s world.

As to the who and why of individual practitioners of terrorism we can only speculate but the broad underlying motive appears to be opposition to an existing order, fueled by a mixture of social and political idealism, personal alienation, mass unemployment and hopelessness, social humiliation, national or ethnic humiliation, religious fundamentalism, and affronted nationalism. This very largely personal motivation has become intertwined with various political movements and the driving force of a number of insurgency movements.

Many of these political movements and insurgencies have taken on a trans-national character, adapting to the increasing global character of contemporary society. Exacerbating this transnational political development is the intermingling of terrorist and insurgent activity with other types of transnational crime, including piracy, kidnapping, human and contraband smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, WMD proliferation, and narco-trafficking. Criminal organizations as well as terrorists groups have gone global presenting new challenges to governments, many of whom are over-matched and out-gunned.

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The result is a global transnational nexus of political and criminal threats. Another way of describing this development is to refer to the rise of network forms of organization, partially as the result of the on-going information revolution. The evolution of insurgency movements utilizing terror tactics into networks reflect what is also happening in other organizations and movements, both legal (business) and illegal (criminal). As Fareed Zakaria put it, “in a globalized world almost all problems spill over border” and all of these problems require foreign policy solutions.

Even more or less solid nation-states now come under attack by actors representing self-proclaimed racial, ethnic, religious and class entities. As borders have become more open in an increasingly globalized world, illegal trafficking of all kinds, illegal migration, and the opportunities for international terrorism increase exponentially. The threat to the large number of more fragile states in today’s world is obvious. More broadly, it is the Westphalian nation-state system itself that is under attack.

“We may not be interested in chaos, but chaos is interested in us. ... At its worst, in the form of terrorism, chaos can become a serious threat to the whole international order.”² British diplomat Richard Cooper observed. The logical as well as obvious response to the threat is effective mobilization of that nation-state system. In addition to the necessary national response by individual countries, a coordinated response by the international community as a whole, or as many members of it as can be recruited, is required. This must take place at several levels: governments themselves, governments operating in formal and informal coalitions with their friends and allies, and governments acting formally in the structure of international organizations.

The Uses of Diplomacy

Too much discussion and comment about appropriate counter-terrorism efforts has focused on what are essentially operational and tactical policies and programs. The persistent, and essentially meaningless, argument as to whether terrorism is a military or law enforcement problem has dominated too much discussion when it is obvious that it is a “Whole of Government” problem where almost all aspect of governance must be involved. A central theme in most of the commentary on dealing with terrorism is the need for balance, breadth, and long-term consistency in policy and programs. The most effective approach must be developed in the context of a multifaceted policy with political, legal, social, diplomatic, economic, and military elements.

The first and most obvious level of response must be by individual governments themselves, in fulfillment of the core responsibility of any government to provide security within its territory. The performance of governments - individually and collectively - should be the central focus of policy for dealing with contemporary terrorism. Only governments can provide meaningful physical security at home and deal comprehensively with the package of “root causes”. Countries with competent and legitimate governments do not produce an environment conducive to the growth of

² Robert Cooper, “The Breaking of Nations”, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003

terrorist organizations or movements. With this thought in mind, many governments are now moving away from “stove-piped” policies: e.g. the War on Drugs, the War on Terrorism. For instance, more effective border controls inhibit all sorts of criminals, and need not be specific to any particular form of crime or insurgency.

But individual national government action while necessary is not sufficient. Collective action is required, collective action with three themes. First is the active cooperation and coordination of like-minded governments which current agree on the threat of terrorism and have decided to combat it. Second, is a concerted effort to convince governments currently standing on the sidelines that their interests in the long run are threatened and that they cannot continue to stand aside. Thirdly, is an effort – possibly the most difficult of all – to convince governments tacitly or openly supporting terrorism that dissociation from the use or acceptance of terrorism as a general principal is in their interest. The overall objective is to foster an increasing willingness of as many states as possible to combine their efforts to defeat or discourage terrorist organizations. The growing promise of international cooperation is a central counterterrorism weapon for governments, individually and collectively.

It is important to include in this effort governments that currently use terrorism as an instrument of national policy. When doing so they are, sadly, engaging in a somewhat traditional activity; governments have done so since time immemorial in pursuit of what they consider to be their national interests. Most governmental support for terrorism generally comes from self-proclaimed “revolutionary” governments such as the now defunct and not missed regimes of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s USSR. Here the government in question itself is challenging the international status quo. In these cases, the foreign policy objective of other governments is to induce such states to change their practices through persuasion, bribery, or nonviolent coercion. “Diplomacy looms large in this struggle.”³

But whether organizing collective action against terrorism or attempting to convince terrorist supporters to desist, the desired results calls for effective use of the traditional tools of diplomacy and international law - “in the application of diplomatic skills, in its empowerment and utilization of international organizations, in its clever alliance-building, in its shrewd intelligence gathering and sharing”.⁴ To build and foster the necessary political will for common counterterrorism objectives we need consistent diplomatic engagement among counterparts and senior leaders. This is a traditional role for diplomacy and diplomats. The traditional tools of governments – engagement, building political will, and capacity building – apply in combating terrorism as much as they do in any area of national security requiring international cooperation as was explained recently by the American Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Ambassador Daniel Benjamin.⁵

³ Barry. R. Posen, in “Terrorism and Counterterrorism”, McGraw Hill/Dushkin, 2002

⁴ Paul Kennedy, in “The Age of Terror”, edited by Talbott and Chanda, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2001

⁵ Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, conference at Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 21, 2010

The fundamental diplomatic objective is always to influence other governments “to induce these states to change their practices though persuasion, bribery, or nonviolent coercion.” Henry Kissinger’s pungent comment on diplomacy merely reflects the truth that strategies have both a diplomatic as well as military dimension.

The objective must be to ensure that each government contributes what it can to the common effort in pursuit of its own interest as a member of the international community; beginning with looking first to its own needs for “homeland security”. Again from Fareed Zakaria, “the best systemic protection against the threat of terrorism would be a global set of customs and immigration controls that check people and cargo around the world, using the same standards and sharing databases.”⁶ For countries with a global role like the United States, this approach would indicate a more inclusive form of international leadership. In sum, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency is “What Mozart teaches us: it’s an opera not a song. Everything involves coalitions, interagency cooperation, international/NGO actions, combining a multiplicity of factors that must be taken.”⁷

Format of the Strategic Response

Political terrorism is a form of conflict involving serious crimes under national criminal codes and international law. Within the borders of any country, political terrorism is an internal problem akin to criminality managed in accordance with that country’s political and legal systems. However the international Westphalian nation-state system does not possess a similarly comprehensive political and legal regime. The international political system is one without government, no institution with a legitimate monopoly on the use of force stands above nation-states to guarantee their safety and their security, Because no authority stands above the, state in the nation-state system are sovereign and are bound only by laws and treaties to which they assent, and by their own interpretation of their national interests.

Still the international system is not completely a Hobbesian world, most of the time most nations obey international law and comply with their international agreements. The system is not completely devoid of rules and norms.

This is particularly true with respect to violent international conflict for which there is a code of behavior, admittedly more often honored in the breach than in the observance. Still there are principals and precedents, the most prominent example being “Just War’ theory which attempts to regulate recourse to force by states by the principles of *ius ad bellum* and the conduct of hostilities by the principles of *ius in bello*. Classic just war doctrine, however, was most concerned with the use of force by a political entities of a traditional character – republics, kingdoms, principalities, empires and the like. Today, and especially with regard to transnational terrorism, we are dealing with the use of force by non-state political actors which also raises the question of how may state actors legitimately respond.

⁶ Fareed Zakaria, “The Post-American World”, W.W. Norton & Company, 2008

⁷ Professor William Olson, Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in a lecture.

However international law has fallen beyond this particular development in the practice of cross-border and sub-state terrorism. Terrorism poses particular difficulties for the *ius ad bellum* principals of competent authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, and probability of success and for the *ius in bello* principals of proportionality and discrimination. By explicating further these principals for the contemporary scene we can perhaps agree on effective new guidelines for dealing with terrorism. Doing so may even help us solve the old conundrum of “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.”

Still there have been developments. “One of the most remarkable achievements in diplomatic history was the creation of the network of multilateral, regional, and bilateral institutions and alliances that preserved, and solidified peace, prosperity and stability for the US and its partners following WWII. International organizations have long helped to establish common standards and norms covering everything from international mail to the safe operation of flights across borders. On occasion they have been of use in political and military situations, a much more difficult arena’.⁸

Central to this development were the creation of the United Nation and an accompanying community of regional international organizations. Extensive efforts in the United Nations are particularly notable.

“The United Nations, as originally conceived, belongs to this universe. It represents an attempt to establish law and order within the modern state system. ... in conception the collective security element of the UN Charter represents and attempt to throw the weight of the international system behind the status quo.”⁹

UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and SC 1373 (2001) which, inter alia, declared AQ & Taliban as terrorist organizations and obliged governments to track and report on financial movements and which created the Counterterrorism Committee were important contributions to international law and practice. Guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), the CTC has been working to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions. The CTC is assisted in its efforts by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which carries out the policy decisions of the Committee, conducts expert assessments of each Member State and facilitates counter-terrorism technical assistance to countries.

There are numerous other international organizations, all of which have taken note of the terrorism problem in one way or another, although their active contribution has been minimal. One exception, of course, is NATO whose robust military alliance character has enabled it to play a

⁸ Luigi R. Einaudi, in “America’s Security Role in a Changing World”, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, 2009)

⁹ Robert Cooper, “The Breaking of Nations”, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003

more significant role. Apart from military coordination and cooperation, such as in Afghanistan, the NATO decision to invoke its Article 5 in response to the September 11 attack on the United States, provided important international legal support to the US Government.

- increase penalty for air piracy;
- suspend UN membership of state sponsors of terrorism;
- UN resolutions; public statements by governments;
- CT measures by other governments;
- financial flow controls;
- travel controls;
- intelligence cooperation;
- CT cooperation (e.g. police & military).

Equally important are efforts to improve bilateral coordination among governments from local police to intelligence to border control, to include sharing of “lessons learned”, sharing and transfer of technology as well as intelligence, joint activities and operations. In addition to these formal institutional measures, there have been numerous multilateral and bilateral agreements, many not taking the form of formal treaties. For instance, a recent issue of *The Economist* reports that since 2007 the intelligence services of Algeria and Morocco have held regular meetings on counter-terrorism in view of a shared local threat. How these fit into the international legal structure is often unclear. Some thought should be given to this matter in order to ensure that the international system is as coherent and clear as possible.

Governments are often faced with serious dilemmas in dealing with cross-border and international crime and terrorism, and the international legal system needs to be as supportive and user friendly as possible. Piracy is an important current example of this problem, specifically in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Africa. While it was thought that international law and practice had long ago settled the question of piracy – branding them as the enemy of all mankind and authorizing all governments to take effective action – in fact the piracy problem off the coast of Somali has raised serious legal problems for those governments participating in the ad hoc multinational patrols. Their naval ships can and do take effective action to prevent and take acts of piracy but then are faced with the question of what to do with perpetrators captured in international waters as hanging from the yardarm seems to have gone out of fashion. In May of 2010, the United States released without taking any legal action against eight Somali pirates who had captured by a US warship and brought to the US for trial.

Problems of Diplomacy

The nation-state, especially since the end of the Cold War, appears to be under siege, and is no longer the only actor on the world scene. Non-state actors are plentiful and globalization spreads

on one hand while localization and national disintegration threatens on the other. The nexus of non-state transnational criminal and political challenges grows in strength while many governments struggle to maintain or establish effective governance in their territories. The spread of so-called ungoverned areas along borders or where states are failing or have failed provides operating space for criminals of all kinds, and especially for terrorist organizations.

However the report of the death of the nation-state and the nation-state international system is probably premature. The nation-state system is predicated upon the assumption that each sovereign state is capable of wielding effective power in its territory and that each state is obliged to prevent its territory from being used to attack others, including use as a base for terrorism. While many governments today appear unable to meet this obligation – the phenomena of failed and failing states is a serious contemporary problem – the sovereign state remains the ideal of most societies and even feeble governments remain important actors on the global stage.

Still, the problems of weak governments combined with the complexity of the modern world and the persistence of conflicting national interests inevitably frustrate efforts to obtain consensus on the question of terrorism. The inability to reach an agreed definition of terrorism is evidence of this, if we needed it.

The necessary military and police component of counter-terrorism poses another problem for the effective use of diplomacy in dealing with terrorism. International legal documents and agreements are only documents, and it takes governments and their organizational instruments to make them work. As terrorism is essentially the use of force and violence, the need to reply with force and violence to defend society is obvious but raises serious problems. If terrorism is theatre as is so often explained, then blowing up the building in response may not be sufficient even if often necessary. Even if George Orwell did famously note that innocent citizens sleep soundly at night because hard men stand ready to use violence on their behalf, surely he would agree that force must be balanced with other relationships.

Nevertheless the obvious limitations of diplomacy are not really important, as diplomacy is only an instrument, not an end in itself. The international system – with its body of international law, community of international organizations, its tradition of bilateral and multilateral practice – is obviously not a fully sufficient regime but it is a framework for dealing with terrorism. And diplomacy is the software by which it is managed.

International law constitutes the “rules of the game” for this community. Formal diplomacy is a major instrument and process by which governments develop and agree to these rules. If indeed transnational terrorism is a threat to this international community, then all governments who recognize that they have a stake in the global nation-state system must participate in a global counter-terrorist alliance or coalition. Such a coalition already exists, but more needs to be done to strengthen and enhance the relevant international norms. The necessary changes and updating cannot be left to international lawyers as lawyers, but must result from conscious political action by governments, utilizing the traditional instruments of inter-state interaction - diplomacy.

In sum, despite all these limitations there is an international legal community in which nation states are both the members and the “managers”. Almost all governments, except those self-defined as revolutionary, have an investment and an interest in the continuation of that international community. A threat to that that community and to the concept of the nation-state poses a challenge to almost all governments. For governments as well as individuals, survival and self-interest is a powerful motivation.



Turkey and New NATO

Richard WEITZ¹

In May 2010, the group of experts assisting with the drafting of NATO’s new Strategic Concept issued their final report, entitled “NATO 2020: Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement.” This document recommended how the Concept should define the purpose, nature, and fundamental security tasks of the alliance given contemporary and future security environment. The authors stress NATO’s need to develop new partnerships—such as with Russia, Central Asia, and the European Union—and to address the novel security challenges relating to nuclear nonproliferation, missile defense, and Afghanistan. Turkey will play an important role with respect to these and many other issues.

The collective impact of these areas became clear in May 2010, when a joint diplomatic initiative by Prime Minister of Turkey and President of Brazil intended to help resolve the protracted dispute over Iran’s nuclear program further alienated Turkey from the alliance. Months of painstaking mediation efforts appeared to achieve results when they announced a breakthrough agreement in Tehran on May 17. In their declaration, the three governments confirmed Iran’s willingness to “deposit” 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium in Turkey. In return, Iran would receive 120 kilograms of more uranium fuel enriched to a higher level as required to fuel Tehran’s medical research reactor. Prime Minister of Turkey and President of Brazil have argued that the trilateral deal is sufficiently promising that further sanctions, at least in the near term, are unnecessary. Even so, while expressing appreciation for their efforts, only one day later the permanent members of the UN Security Council reached preliminary agreement on the content of another resolution imposing sanctions on Iran for its suspicious nuclear activities.

The trilateral declaration, which has been detailed in a subsequent submission by the Iranian government to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), differs in certain critical respects from the deal proposed to Iran by several NATO countries and their partners, but not Turkey and Brazil, at Vienna last year. It still foresees Iran’s removing the same amount of LEU (1,200 kilograms)

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from its territory, but under the terms of the trilateral agreement, the LEU would be relocated to Turkey, which lacks its uranium enrichment capabilities. Another country would therefore either have to enrich the Iranian LEU further or provide the 19.75 enriched uranium from another source. Whether Iran can reclaim the deposited LEU is uncertain, though the language of the agreement makes clear that Iran retains ownership of the LEU even when it is in Turkey. In addition, whereas the Vienna Group sought to secure a suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment activities as part of the deal, the trilateral declaration explicitly affirms Tehran's right to research, develop, manufacture, and use all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment. Following the declaration, the Iranian government affirmed that it would continue to enrich uranium to the 20 percent level. Another problem is that, as a result of the time that has elapsed since last October, Iran has continued to enrich much more uranium, making the 1,200 kilograms of LEU Iran would exchange under the new trilateral proposal a much smaller share of its total stockpile. While Iran possessed approximately 1,500 kilograms of LEU last October, now its LEU stockpile has grown to about 2,300 kilograms. As a result, even if the Iran-Turkey exchange occurs, Iran would possess, or soon acquire, sufficient LEU to make a nuclear bomb assuming that Iran would enrich its remaining LEU further to weapons-grade levels. The immediate motive behind Tehran's acceptance of the trilateral agreement was its aim to avoid new sanctions. Until recently, Iranian officials had evaded Turkish proposals to mediate the dispute, including an attempt by Ankara last year to allow the proposed nuclear fuel exchange to proceed on its territory. Even in late April, the Iranian Foreign Ministry had continued to insist that any exchange occur within Iran.

The trilateral incident has highlighted major differences between the perspectives of Turkey and the views of many of its NATO partners regarding not only Iran, but the international nuclear order on the whole. The United States, Britain, and France remain adamant that Iran must cease enriching uranium or engaging in other sensitive nuclear activities until Tehran convinces the international community that its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes. Any country that can enrich uranium on an industrial scale, which could be used to manufacture fuel for a nuclear power program, could also probably produce the weapons-grade fissile material needed to power a nuclear weapon. The barrier between making commercial reactor fuel (enriched to the level of 3.5 percent) and manufacturing weapons-grade uranium (enriched to 90 percent), largely depends on time and engineering, not physics. Concerns that the Iranian government is striving to acquire the ability to make nuclear bombs under the guise of pursuing peaceful nuclear activities has led the IAEA and the UN Security Council to adopt various resolutions calling on Tehran to alter its policies. Western governments insist that Tehran comply with longstanding IAEA demands to disclose more data about the military nature of Iran's past, present, and planned future nuclear activities. Doubts about Iran's peaceful intentions have already led the Council to adopt three resolutions imposing various sanctions on Iranian nationals and institutions that engage in suspicious activities.

While Iran has declared to the IAEA its nuclear enrichment activities at its main facilities at Natanz, and has placed them under standard international safeguards, suspicions endure that the Iranian government will produce a weapon using highly enriched uranium manufactured at a

clandestine site that is not under IAEA supervision. In order to prevent such a development and increase the transparency of Iran's nuclear activities, Western governments want Tehran to accede to the IAEA Additional Protocol, which empowers agency personnel to monitor and inspect even undeclared facilities where covert nuclear activities might be occurring. The Iranian government voluntarily implemented the Additional Protocol from October 2003 until mid-October 2005, but has since ceased complying. Iranians claim that the Central Intelligence Agency and foreign intelligence services exploited the IAEA inspections to collect information about Iran's non-nuclear activities.

Turkish officials have argued that the best method to prevent Iranians from seeking nuclear weapons is to address their underlying sources of their insecurity. Rather than rely on threats and sanctions, Turkish policy makers want to offer Iran security pledges in return for reciprocal guarantees that Tehran will not use its nuclear activities for military purposes. In addition to issues directly related to Iran, Turkey and Brazil have long objected to key dimensions of the global nuclear order. Turkish and Brazilian officials decry the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for legitimizing a discriminatory hierarchy that privileges certain countries by legally allowing them to keep their nuclear weapons, perhaps indefinitely, as well as by enforcing restrictions on the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. The two governments also object to the unrepresentative nature of the bodies that enforce the Treaty, especially the UN Security Council, which includes a small percentage of the world's nation states and gives only five countries—precisely those the NPT recognizes as nuclear-weapons states—veto power over actions aimed at enforcing the NPT and other nonproliferation agreements. The Turkish government insists that any country should have the right to engage in all civilian nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment and the other phases of the cycle needed to produce nuclear fuel, provided that state applies traditional IAEA safeguards and complies with other nonproliferation standards. Furthermore, Turkish officials attack the alleged hypocrisy of Western governments in approaching nonproliferation issues. They note that these countries have repeatedly sought to sanction Iran despite its adoption of the NPT and the lack of conclusive evidence that Iranians are actively pursuing nuclear weapons. In contrast, Western leaders make only rhetorical efforts to persuade Israel to accede to the NPT and eliminate its widely suspected nuclear weapons stockpile. The Turkish government strongly supports transforming the entire Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Ironically, Turkey is commonly thought to have dozens of American tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on its territory at the Incirlik Air Base. Although NATO countries refuse to discuss the location and numbers of their nuclear weapons in public, Turkey is widely considered to still host U.S. nuclear weapons within the alliance's "nuclear-sharing" framework. This arrangement allows member states not having nuclear weapons to "share" U.S.-provided nuclear bombs that they can theoretically deliver on their own (primarily by using fighter bombers). In principle, it empowers more NATO member countries to participate in the alliance's planning and possible use of nuclear weapons if they so choose. In peacetime, American soldiers stationed at their storage sites—specially constructed vaults on certain airfields—keep the weapons under tight control, while host-nation

pilots train with dummy warheads. In wartime, the American president can authorize the weapons' release, as well as the codes for detonating them, to the host-nation's military command.

Influential members of the Turkish national security establishment are widely suspected of resisting proposals to relinquish these TNWs. Since only four other NATO members still host U.S. TNW under NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangement, and three of them (but not the governments of Turkey or Italy) have indicated they would like to remove them as soon as possible, this situation has complicated efforts to agree on a NATO-wide policy with respect to TNWs. The April 2010 informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn discussed this issue, in preparation for a final decision at the NATO heads-of-state summit in Lisbon scheduled for this November. Papering over disagreements, the ministers at Tallin specified several "clear themes" that they agreed would guide their approach toward the TNW issue:

- NATO would maintain nuclear weapons as long as any existed
- Member states would not make unilateral decisions regarding NATO's TNW
- The allies would share the burdens of ensuring a safe and credible nuclear deterrent
- NATO would balance the need for a credible nuclear deterrent with making progress on arms control and disarmament issues
- The allied governments must take Russia's much larger TNW stockpile into account when determining NATO's TNW policies

Ideally, many NATO governments want to work with NATO to reduce mutual TNW holdings and ensure that any nuclear weapons they did keep more safe, secure, and transparent.

According to the available information, unlike the other four European countries hosting U.S. TNW, the Turkish Air Force reportedly is not presently certified to conduct nuclear missions, which have purchased aircraft capable of dropping U.S. nuclear-armed gravity bombs. The Turkish government also does not normally authorize U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers to deploy at Incirlik Air Base. As a result, the only way these weapons could be used in a crisis is if the United States or other NATO countries send nuclear-capable bombers to Turkey, where they could be loaded with the bombs. These factors significantly reduce the weapons' value as prompt credible deterrents. In practice, neither Turkish nor NATO planners seem especially concerned by this situation since the main purpose of the U.S. nuclear bombs in Turkey is not for operational use. Instead, the weapons help to symbolize the alliance's commitment to Turkey's defense, underscore the special security relationship between Washington and Ankara, and elevate Turkey's status within NATO and European security deliberations.

Attempting to withdraw the nuclear weapons from Turkey without the support of its government and the Turkish national security establishment could generate major problems. Many Turkish policy makers already doubt the credibility of NATO security commitments due to

several earlier incidents following the end of the shared Soviet threat. Notably, before both recent wars against Iraq, some European governments displayed obvious reluctance to use their own militaries to protect Turkey from Iraqi missile strikes. Although the United States did offer some protection, the Turkish government and people were unenthusiastic about their forced involvement in wars with a neighboring country. They feared becoming victims of Iraqi retaliation, suffering economic losses, and the increased potential for regional instability no matter what the conflicts' outcome. Washington's subsequent support for increasing Iraqi Kurds' autonomy within Iraq exacerbated Turkish worries about similar aspirations spreading among Turkey's Kurdish origin citizens. Turkish security experts have long been disappointed by the reluctance of fellow NATO members to assist Turkey's counterterrorist operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or to defend the Turkish people in northern Cyprus. Removing the TNWs at Incirlik without Ankara's approval might also prompt Turkey to develop its own nuclear deterrent, especially if Iran proceeds to develop a nuclear weapons capacity. Some Turkish officials see having physical access to NATO TNWs as compensating for Ankara's not developing an independent Turkish nuclear arsenal. Should NATO leaders decide to reduce substantially or eliminate the alliance's TNWs, they must assure Ankara that Turkey will still exert great influence on NATO's security policies. Insofar as some members of Turkey's security community are still concerned by Russia's nearby nuclear and conventional security forces, then NATO initiatives aimed at linking any withdrawal of U.S. TNW from Turkey with changes in Russian military policies would presumably be welcome in Ankara. The recently negotiated New START Treaty does not address TNWs, but the Obama administration has indicated that it plans to address the issue in the next round of bilateral nuclear negotiations with Russia. In addition, multinational negotiations between Russia and NATO might occur. In either case, Turkish policy makers should participate in the talks in some capacity.

NATO leaders might also seek to secure Ankara's support for reducing its TNWs by offering Turkey enhanced ballistic missile defense (BMD) protection. The Obama administration's revised European BMD implementation plans already envisage deploying U.S. missile defenses more rapidly and more closely to Turkish territory, which should help assuage Ankara's concerns. In any case, Turkey has already assumed a pivotal role in Europe's future missile defense BMD architecture. In recent years, U.S. officials have been lobbying Ankara to participate in its program within a NATO framework, while Iran and Russia have encouraged Turkey to keep its distance from Washington's BMD plans. Turkish policy makers have tried to balance these competing forces, while simultaneously leveraging them to advance Ankara's own regional security interests. First, they have sought to defend Turkey against possible missile threats. Second, they have aimed to highlight Turkey's value as a NATO and U.S. ally by supporting their BMD initiatives. Third, Turkish leaders have sought to avoid antagonizing Russia or Iran, whose governments have expressed opposition to NATO and U.S. missile defense programs located in their proximity.

Turkish policy makers, like other NATO governments, are eager to protect their national territories from ballistic missile threats. Turkish government representatives publicly downplay

concerns about Iran's progress in developing missile technologies, but at least some members of Turkey's national security establishment have expressed unease about Iran's growing military capabilities. Iran's Shahab-3, a missile derived from the North Korean Nodong that has a maximum range of about 1,500km when carrying a warhead of less than one tonne, cannot reach targets in southeastern Europe, but it can hit targets in the Middle East, including Israel, and Turkey.

Turkish officials became concerned in 2006 and 2007, when NATO appeared to have started constructing a missile defense architecture, based on the U.S. BMD systems planned for Poland and the Czech Republic, which would not soon extend to shield Turkey and other southeast European countries from missile strikes. At the time, the BMD assets envisaged for Poland and the Czech Republic would have lacked the technical capabilities to identify, track, and intercept ballistic missiles launched from Iran toward Turkey or fellow NATO allies Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. After the governments of these countries protested their exclusion, the June 2007 NATO Defense Ministers' meeting commissioned a study of how to integrate the U.S. and NATO BMD initiatives to ensure coverage of Turkey and other southeastern European NATO members by using short-range NATO BMD systems under development as a "bolt-on" to the longer-range U.S. BMD systems planned for Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition to technical considerations, the NATO governments had to address the funding issues associated with a BMD extension that would benefit only the few NATO members situated near Iran.

The decision last September by the Obama administration to deploy shorter-range interceptors and a variety of radar systems closer to Iran should help resolve some Turkish concerns about NATO's emerging BMD architecture. The new U.S. plans will protect Turkish territory more effectively, while the heightened U.S. funding commitment increases the likelihood that the system will be established despite the lukewarm attitude of some NATO governments toward paying for BMD. Yet, the new American focus on deploying BMD systems in southeast Europe makes it more difficult for Turkish policy makers to evade Russian and Iranian objections to NATO's BMD initiatives. Under its "phased adaptive approach," the Obama administration, like the previous Bush administration, intends to deploy more effective U.S. BMD systems in Europe over time as missile defense technology improves and as Iran continues to develop more effective offensive missiles. Turkish officials would prefer not to antagonize Iran and Russia, Turkey's two largest suppliers of oil and gas, while supporting U.S. or NATO BMD systems. Since the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, abbreviated as *AKP*) assumed office in 2002, it has sought to improve ties with Tehran and Moscow. Iranian policy makers would naturally see any Turkish-based NATO BMD system as directed against them, which could weaken Turkey's preferred role as mediator between Iran and the West. If Iranian officials feared a Western attack or ever planned to launch Iran's long-range missiles in a war, they would likely attempt to destroy or at least disable any BMD facilities located in Turkey beforehand. Meanwhile, Russian strategists worry that improvements in U.S. and NATO BMD systems could also threaten Russia's long-range nuclear-armed missiles. They will presumably pressure Turkey to limit its support for these deployments.

Another unresolved issue is how the new U.S. BMD plans will affect Turkey's independent BMD capacity. When Turkish officials announced in September 2009 that they would spend at least one billion dollars to construct a national BMD architecture, they did not indicate how the new Turkish systems would relate to U.S. and NATO missile defense. Turkish policy makers are considering buying missile defense systems from Chinese, Russian, West European, and U.S. companies. They have insisted that their national missile defense programs are not aimed at countering a specific foreign threat, though Turkish concerns about Iran and Greece are obvious. Even the Obama administration's redesigned BMD architecture for Europe will not have the capability to defend Turkey's territory near the country's 500-kilometer border with Iran from nearby Iranian missiles due to their very short flight time. And NATO governments would presumably not automatically provide military assistance to Ankara in any Greece-Turkey war.

Turkey's BMD dilemmas would likely decrease if NATO and Russia established a joint BMD architecture, or at least agreed to collaborate sufficiently on missile defense to enable Turkey to contribute to a NATO system without antagonizing Russia. A few days before Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Washington on December 7, 2009, Vladimir Ivanovskiy, Russia's ambassador to Turkey, stated his government would support Turkey's hosting U.S. BMD systems if Ankara, Moscow, and Washington partnered on the project. An alternative proposal, first made by then Russian President Vladimir Putin at the June 2007 G-8 summit, is for Russia and the United States to jointly use the Russian-leased early warning radar located at Gabala in Azerbaijan, a close Turkish ally, to monitor Iranian missile developments. Azerbaijani authorities have seemed receptive to the proposal, which if implemented would not oblige Turkey to host a joint Russia-U.S. BMD site itself. Although the operational value of a jointly managed Russian-American base is uncertain given the probable reluctance of either country to share sensitive BMD data with the other, a Russian-American agreement regarding the radar might provide Turkey with sufficient diplomatic cover to avoid having to antagonize NATO or Russia.

Despite Ankara's unease with Moscow's policies toward Chechnya, Armenia, and Georgia, as well as concern over Russia's recent military resurgence, many Turkish leaders no longer perceive Russia as an imminent military threat to Turkey. Since Putin became president at the end of 1999, Russian leaders have cultivated relations with Ankara. Russia became Turkey's largest trading partner in 2008, while Turkey now ranks as Russia's seventh largest partner. Russia currently supplies almost two thirds of Turkey's natural gas consumption (which provides most of Turkey's electricity) and one fifth of its domestic oil needs. Thanks to Turkey's growing consumption of Russian energy, bilateral commerce peaked at some \$33.8 billion in 2008. Although this figure declined in 2009 due to the worldwide recession, decreases in the world prices for Russian oil and gas, and the contraction in international commerce, influential Turkish and Russian business leaders have developed a strong interest in preserving good bilateral relations.

One reason why many Turks have seen Russia as a more attractive partner has been Turkey's growing alienation from its traditional West European security allies. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's security managers have become concerned about becoming isolated within the

emerging European security architecture, in which the European Union (EU), which has declined to admit Turkey, has assumed a more prominent role. Turkey's exclusion from EU decision-making structures means that Ankara exerts little impact on EU policies that could affect its core security concerns. Turkish decision makers also worry about the EU's lack of will and ability to defend the country. Despite some recent progress, the EU has yet to develop the more robust military assets available to NATO, which includes the U.S. armed forces. Despite Turkey's extensive support for EU-led operations, Turkey policy makers argue that the EU has failed to fulfill its commitment to allow Ankara to participate in its security decisions. Instead, the EU members typically decide policies independently, and then invite Ankara to support policies that Turkey had no opportunity to shape.

Since 2007, 21 countries have been members of both NATO and the EU. Since both institutions operate by consensus when making important security decisions, those states that have membership in one organization but not the other enjoy great influence in shaping the level of cooperation between the two institutions. At present, NATO members Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, and the United States are not EU members, while the traditionally neutral or non-aligned EU members Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden are not NATO members, though four of the five (but still not Cyprus) have joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which allows for institutionalize collaboration between members and partners in support of NATO goals. As a result, cooperation between the EU and NATO has in turn been hampered by the Turkish-Cypriot dispute. Turkish objections to sharing sensitive NATO military information with Cyprus have limited formal NATO-EU intelligence sharing since 2004, when Cyprus joined the EU. The Cypriot government has retaliated by blocking Turkey's participation in certain EU defense activities. These mutual antagonisms have disrupted past NATO-EU collaboration and enable Turkey to deny NATO collective assets for any future EU-led mission.

Both NATO and the EU have been fortunate in that their dispute has not impeded Turkey's important contribution to establishing peace and security in Afghanistan. Turkey's military contributions have been channeled through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Turkey has twice led ISAF as well as various ISAF regional commands. Turkey presently contributes some 1,800 troops in Afghanistan. They help train members of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police as support ANSF development. At the same time, several factors have constrained Turkey's engagement in Afghanistan. These include a concern about becoming bogged down in an unwinnable war, alienation for U.S. policies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and fears of antagonizing fellow Muslims by appearing to join a Western (Christian) crusade. These concerns, manifested in low popular support for Turkish participation in the war, have made the Turkish government cautious about its level of involvement, especially in the military realm. Turkish forces have thus far shunned direct participation in counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operations. Conversely, Turkish officials have launched several diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing the underlying causes of the Afghan conflict, such as the tense relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since 2007, Turkey has hosted annual trilateral summit meetings

involving Afghan, Pakistani, and Turkish representatives, including the presidents and senior intelligence and military officers from each country. The most recent meeting on January 25, 2010, adopted programs to support the reconciliation and reintegration of Taliban members who agree to lay down their arms. The participants also discussed collaborating on health, education, and other socioeconomic projects.

In certain respects, NATO and Turkey are natural partners in Afghanistan. Turkey has unique cultural and geographic assets in this regard. It is one of the two NATO countries having a Muslim-majority population (together with Albania), a valuable attribute for a Western-led military operation in a Muslim-majority country (Afghanistan) and region (Central Asia). Turkey's location is also pivotal since Afghanistan, unlike the former Yugoslavia, is very much "out-of-area" for a transatlantic alliance. Turkish military facilities, especially İncirlik Base, have helped sustain NATO logistics in Afghanistan. For their part, Ankara's strong support for the Afghan mission helps underscore Turkey's contribution to European security. Insofar as both NATO and the EU expect to remain present in Eurasia for years to come, they all benefit from Turkey's strong regional profile and reputation, providing it can be harmonized with the security objectives of the non-regional powers.



The Contributions of Turkey to Global Security

Ali ÇAĞLAR*

Abstract

The main purpose of this study is to discuss the contributions made by Turkey to the global security. In order to reach this goal, today’s concept of global security has been handled first within the context of historical and conceptual background, and then Turkey’s contributions to the global security has been explained and discussed. As known, Turkey has made important contributions to UN and OSCE missions throughout the world in recent decades. The data needed for this paper have been collected from the related literature and the security institutions, both military and police, of Turkey.

1. Global Security

The word “security” is related to the concept of self-protection. Security need is a *sine qua non* requirement which is basically of a three-folded nature: first, ensuring the survival of the human being; second, protecting him/her against the nature surrounding it and the other living creatures; and third, preserving his/her existence and identity shaped by the fundamental rights and freedom.

In order to cope with the insecurity posed by the nature in which he/she lives in, and the other living things, human being uses knowledge and theoretical awareness, which makes him/her different from the others. By using knowledge, human being creates tools and techniques, which minimize the insecurity posed by nature or/and by its fellow creatures. Through those tools and techniques, human being advances in science, arts, commerce, etc. It is obvious that individual

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security perceptions or perceptions of threat(s) to security may show differences from person to person. Furthermore, it is possible to claim that there are different units of analysis than individual in security studies. At individual level, it is about a person's security or security perceptions. Individual person as human being is the unit of analysis. However, at societal level, individual unit earns a relationship within a larger unit: Society itself. The form and the characteristics of the society under study may change but, in political realm, as it was stated by Thomas Hobbes, the most important tool for security is to form a government. He based his political thoughts on the concept, which is called "state of nature". According to him, humans are equal and capable of rational thought, but human nature is aggressive and greedy, and human life is "brutish and short". The state of nature is ruthless and frightening. In this state of humanity, no development in science, arts, commerce, etc., is possible because existence itself is so fragile. In order to let the human cope with threats posed by both the nature and its fellows, and thus be able to advance in science, first and foremost, there is a need for a strong authoritarian government to control humans' violent passions. For Hobbes, providing security is the basic pillar and the sole purpose to the political thoughts on forming a government (Hobbes, 1994).

Hobbesian security approach has been echoed, to a large extent, in the works of the Realists in International Relations as an academic field of study, such as Hans Morgenthau. Wars are inevitable and forever in international system because of this brutal human nature. Hobbes assumes that the "state of nature" is an extremely hostile nature in which there is a permanent "state of war" of every man against every man. Human beings can cooperate with each other because of this "fear of death" and so they can develop political institutions with this aim namely "sovereign state." However, this creates another state of nature between states. This is referred as "the security dilemma" in world politics.

As for the insecurity posed by governments and states to others, Kant argues the requirement for a stable, perpetual peace among states. To achieve this goal, he suggests that states join together in order to constitute a league of nations. Nations in form of state can be appraised as individuals, who in their natural conditions are already aggressive and greedy and, each of them, for the sake of its security, can and ought to require the others to enter with it into a constitution similar to a civil constitution, in which each can be assured of its right (Kant, 1996:8).

Contrary to Kant, Hegel criticizes the hopes of a possible peace among nations resulting from a Kantian pact of peace saying in "Philosophy of Right";

Kant had the idea of securing 'perpetual peace' by a league of nations that would adjust every dispute. It was to be a power recognized by each individual state, and it was to arbitrate in all cases of dissension in order to make it impossible for disputants to resort to war in order to settle them. This idea presupposes an accord between states which would rest on moral or religious or other grounds or considerations, but in any case would always depend ultimately on a particular sovereign will and for that reason would remain infected with contingency (Hegel, 1982:333).

Borges, on the other hand, argues that it is possible to see the streamlines of above discussion in contemporary international politics. The Hegelian way of thinking, which argues that the particular sovereign nation, who can dictate her will to secure so called “a higher degree of freedom”, has the right to be the ultimate judge of the world¹. Contrary to Kantian school, the idea of League of Nations has inspired the creation of the United Nations which is still a vibrant institution for people who believe in an international league for peace (Borges, 2006:81-84).

Though there is a vast difference between these two approaches, the very basic concept of the “security within its international context” remains unchanged. Similar to the explanation at the very beginning of this work, it means to ensure survival of the population; to protect territorial integrity and, to preserve the basic identity of a nation, as shaped by political, economic, social and cultural traits.

Political, economic, social and cultural traits have changed dramatically over the years particularly after the end of the Cold War. It has began to be evaluated that we have stepped up to a new era; namely globalization and become fashionable to describe the world as a global village. Though the current security environment has to further strengthen above mentioned Kantian thought and, confirm that security is becoming truly indivisible, there are still doubts in the streamline of globalization whether; we will all be more secure in the future.

Principally based on that doubt, policy discourses in academic studies have also begun to change by the end of the Cold War. According to Bigo, after the Cold War, the term regional security has been less visible under the impact of changing security understanding of leading powers. With this broadening and deepening comprehension of insecurities, security as a concept has also been increasingly deepening and broadening. Now, new threats are imposed by not only states but also by other actors and new sub-state/trans-state networks such as organized crimes, terrorist organizations and for some, by illegal/irregular immigrants. More importantly they target not only the state, or in more true sense, not “the” state but instead these new threats endanger three factors: border, order and identity that state got used to represent during the Cold War years (Bigo, 2001).

Recent debates among post-modernist political scientist such as Agnew (1994), Albert and Brock (1996), and Adler (1997) has also tended to focus on the fact that borders are no longer understood as self-evident, inevitable, invariable or ineradicable lines that have to be taken for granted. Even some scholars found different terms for this; -so called- borderless security understanding, ranging from securitization to post-security (Waever, 1998; Joenniemi, 2007).

On the other hand some recent studies, like David Landes’ take these optimistic views as a fallacy. Landes addresses in his recent book, “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations”, very basic but utterly important question; “If the world became a global village so, the village elders must be pondering some very disturbing questions: why is it that some people are so rich and some so poor? Why do the rich get richer and the poor get poorer? (Landes, 1998).

¹ As stated by the former US Presidents, G. W. Bush in particular, in many occasions.

Similarly Pak says;

We have all been conditioned to acclaim the catchy term ‘globalization’. But deep inside, many of us have come to harbor reservations about the sweeping changes the process entails. The idea of unimpeded contact between the peoples of this very special globe, the only biosphere we so far know of, sounds good. But, along with it, different sounds have come. Some of these were barely clothed bodies brandishing machetes. Some were state-of-the-art weapons designed and produced for wholesale butchery (Pak, 2001:1).

In fact, in the light of post-modernist policy discourses, we all expect to be less fragmented with the view under the US lead economic enforcement towards unification, liberalization, and globalization². Especially in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political scene is witnessing the emergence of an increasing augmentation in nationalistic tendencies and approaches within the existing states. With the end of the Cold War a number of independent states have been formed on the territories of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In other words, at the end of Cold War, in accordance with the globalization discourse and search for being the leading power, a New World (Dis)Order is being discussed. This was a new hegemonic strategy to control and govern the world as much as possible.

It would be meaningful right here to recall the studies provided by the Copenhagen School. In their book entitled as *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde described the term security on the basis of Constructivist Approach to international security. Accordingly, security as a concept can be constructed. Securitization is a process. Certain issues are transformed by an actor (generally the hegemonic power in the system) into a matter of security. (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, 1998: *passim*)

In the post-Cold War period, there were lots of racial, ethnical, tribal, religious and sectarian clashes in many countries. According to the Macionis and Plummer there were 80 armed conflicts between 1989 and 1992. Only 3 of them were between states. The others were interstate conflicts (Macionis and Plummer, 2002:257). As a consequence, the policy and strategy adopted was destroying nation-states and supporting micro-nationalism in targeted countries. For example, in Sudan: Muslim Arabs in North and Christians in South; in Sri Lanka: Hindu Tamils and Budists; in Indonesia: Indonesia and East Timour; in Ruwanda: Hutuies and Tuduies; in Afganistan: Taliban, Hikmetyar and Gn. Dostum, recently NATO and Taliban; in Irak: Kurds and Arabs, later Shias and Sunnies; in Pakistan: Shias and Sunnies; in Lebanon: Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs; in Russia: Russians and Checenians; in Georgia: Georgians and Acars, S. Osetyans and Abhazs; in Azerbaijan: Azeries, Armenians and Lezgies; in Macedonia: Macedonians and Albanians; in Jugoslavia: Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Albanians; in Czechoslovakia: Czechs and Slovaks; in

² Like in Hegelian school of thought: Particular sovereign nation who can dictate her will to secure so called “a higher degree of freedom” has the right to be the ultimate judge of the world.

Israel: Jews and Palestinian Arabs, etc... There have also been many other inter-conflicts in African countries.

Globalization had been expected to be beneficial because vast sums of money would have been transferred from rich to poor, and shared among the villagers. Whole libraries would have been open to researchers everywhere. There would have been no single source for information, and practically no way to control it. If knowledge had been a sole real power, then this power would have been shared more equitably, and to more people, than has ever been possible in the history of humanity. But we unfortunately observe the fact which ignores; not only the frontiers of states, but the very basic concept of security. Newly emerging threats such as, new and more organized wave of terrorism, illegal trade of small arms and weapons, mass migration, human trafficking and the laundering of money generated by these notorious activities, are all partly or wholly related to the magic word globalization. As a result, we are now becoming more convinced about the Kantian School of Thought that, those newly emerging insecurities cannot be broken by one state alone, or even by a group of states. It will require global awareness, global commitment, and global action.

In summary, we are becoming less and less powerless against new threats emerging in the era of globalization as former UN secretary General Boutros B. Ghalli said;

Globalization is characterized by the weakening of state control over a variety of sectors: finance, information, transport of goods and services, the environment, and population movements. Second, the strains of globalization have led to the fragmentation of states and societies, the rise of violence and civil conflict, the marginalization of entire groups within a particular society and of entire states in the globalised economy (Ghalli, 1996:4).

As again Ghalli pointed out, national security, regional security and global security are getting more and more linked to each other and UN may be a proper ground for developing measures related to the universal security.

United Nations must develop the means to prevent the fragmentation of states and societies. This can be through enhanced economic cooperation, through the development of regionalism... Above all, the UN will be central to reversing the marginalization of entire societies, and sharing with them the benefits of globalization... Essential building block of the international system must remain the state, which alone is capable of preventing the chaotic breakdown of order caused by the strains of globalization... The United Nations is responsive both to the needs of state sovereignty and to the increasing welfare needs of the world population (Ghalli, 1996:5).

Moreover, the end of the Cold War resulted in huge amount of surplus weapons becoming available illegally. There was a need to stop the spread of such weapons and offer assistance with

their destruction process. Border monitoring ranges from conflict prevention to post-conflict management and capacity-building. Institutional support was also required as an urgent action to intervene with the conflict and post-conflict areas. In other words, operations were required to prevent conflicts arising and to facilitate lasting comprehensive political settlements for current conflicts, making peace, keeping peace, forcing to peace and to help the process of rehabilitation and capacity building in post-conflict areas. There was also another need to provide a framework for political dialogue on military reforms.

These social, political, cultural, economical instabilities created a need for intervention to such countries to prevent massive human killings and massacres. The main question was that who must legally intervene to the conflicts and restore the peace again. In this process, of course, the first entity to come to mind at global level or as a universal organization was the UN. The OSCE³, as a regional organization, did also help in restoring peace in post-conflict countries.

Turkey, as a member country of both UN and OSCE, made substantial military and policing contributions to the security programs. Besides her military contributions, Turkey made also other contributions such as restoration and constructing of schools, roads, religious and historical buildings, monuments, and distributing food to the people in need. Now, the role of Turkey in this process will be discussed and explained in detail in the following section of the paper.

1. Changing Role of Turkey and Global Security

In the course and after World War II, Turkey's perception related to the international security was being shaped mainly on a problematic of military security. During the Cold War period and within the context of the previous concept of security, the overall role of Turkey has slightly changed. Her contribution to the global security was mainly stemming from her geostrategic position. Turkey together with Norway was serving as Western Block's flank, to hinder the southward passage of the Soviets, in return for a guarantee of territorial integrity.

Though above mentioned role of Turkey lost its importance after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Mediterranean region has acquired an even bigger significance in the post Cold War era in terms of security. Turkey began to be forced to abandon her role as geostrategic passive minor partner in an alliance of "developed nations". The policy discourses have begun to be preoccupied with the issue of "new global order".

As stated above, the global terrorism, the disintegration of states and increasing nationalism have changed the direction of theoretical approaches. Practical applications of the changing perception also began to emerge. This has been exposed with an increasing number of operations

³ The OSCE takes a comprehensive approach to the politico-military dimension of security, which includes a number of commitments by participating States and mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. These commitments can be given as follows: Arms control, border management, combating terrorism, conflict prevention, military reform and policing (OSCE, 2010).

aiming to send civilian/military units to insecure areas and, spending a great deal of money on cases which would be insufficient to guarantee a safer world.

With a view to this changing security posture, Turkey has begun to turn her face actively to the area from Adriatic to China, especially to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to explore her historical economic, social, cultural, political and ideological link as opposed to being a geostrategic passive minor partner in an alliance of “developed nations” and aimed to become a pivotal middle power⁴.

The “Pivotal State Theory” is a recently emerging theory of international politics mainly dealing with the issue of pivotal middle powers in today’s global order. The main question which they ask is how it could be possible for them to act together on global politics, while all of them are chiefly concerned with their own interests? To be a middle power, in addition to size, population, and geostrategic location, a state must have middle-rank economic and military capabilities and emphasize multilateral diplomacy and involvement in international organizations (Holbraad, 1984). Furthermore, a middle power could become active in second-order issues such as peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. In world affairs, middle powers act as catalysts, facilitators and managers (Cooper, 1997).

Pivotal state theorists, Cooper, Higgott, Richard, and Nossal, pay special attention to military capability because middle powers can play a leading role in security issues both at regional and global levels. Pivotal middle powers are, furthermore, regional powers. They occupy the “heartland” of their regions. The role of the pivotal middle powers cannot, however, be limited to their regions. It is somehow a mixture of both. Another feature of pivotal middle powers is their ability to link between the regional and international issues (Ozkan, 2006, 79-83).

According to the information released in the web-site of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Turkish understanding concerning the concept of the global security is exactly the same as expressed by former UN Secretary General Ghalli. Contributing to collective defense and crisis management operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and police missions, containing ethnic and religious conflicts are being listed among the factors needed to be taken into account in today’s concept of security. In addition to this, it has been stated in this web-site as follows:

Security can no longer be achieved solely through military means and policies. Since the definition of security has broadened as such, so should our approach in dealing with these threats. We need to be able to employ a broader combination of military, economic, social and political policies in confronting contemporary challenges. This is the only way to achieve sustainable peace and stability on a global scale (MFA Publications, 2010).

⁴ A state which is strategically located, have a large population and capable of effecting much larger population and, possess some -middle rank- military, economic power.

The basic principles of Turkish Foreign Policy were determined during the Atatürk era. It was declared by the signing of the Lausanne Treaty that Turkish Republic, a new actor as a nation state, was taking place now within the international system. In the pre-Cold War period, Turkey has followed a national, independent, and successful foreign policy in dignity. Rational and peaceful Turkish foreign policy basis was based on respect to the principles of international law, legitimacy, and cooperation with international organizations. Turkey never followed an aggressive foreign policy. Instead, Turkish foreign policy behaviors in that period could be defined as peaceful and humanitarian. Further striking point was that Turkish policy makers did prefer to follow a peace policy simply because they thought that it would be the only policy to serve Turkey's national interests.

To reflect the similar understanding, Turkish General Staff's web-site refers to M. Kemal Atatürk's words about world politics on the occasion of a visit by Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1937:

All of humanity should be viewed as a single body, and each nation should be regarded as an organ of that body. The pain that a finger suffers affects the entire body; thus, we should not disregard troubles occurring in any part of the world. If there is a disturbance anywhere, we should be involved in it as if it happened to us (TGS Publications, 2010).

Turkey is located at one of the most problematic region of the world, she has based her foreign policy upon the motto: "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" as laid down by M. Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. The MFA's "zero problem policy" discourse in recent years is in accordance with this view. However, it is not easy to make it real because of conflicting national interests with neighbors.

2.1. Turkey's Contribution to Global Security

Turkey has been assuming an active part in global security just since the inauguration of the Republic in 1923. In her international relations scheme, Turkey actively promoted cooperation with her neighbors and other countries. Similarly, she also contributed to regional security cooperation efforts at the multilateral level by initiating the establishment of the Balkan Entente of 1934 with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia, as well as the Sadabad Pact of 1937 with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. Turkey became the member of the NATO in 1952. While remaining committed to the security of the alliance, Turkey also continued her traditional security policies based on the promotion of cooperation in her adjacent regions. In this context, Turkey initiated security cooperation both in the Balkans and the Middle East. The Balkan Pact of 1954 with Greece and Yugoslavia and the Baghdad Pact of 1955 with Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan were the concrete results of initiatives aimed at the consolidation of security in these regions. After the collapse of the

Soviet Union, within the atmosphere of increasing vulnerability to threats of global nature, cooperation and joint action surfaced as the most effective instruments. At present, a founding member of the UN, member of NATO and all leading European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, as well as a negotiating country for membership in the European Union, Turkey actively pursues a policy geared at enhancing friendship and cooperation in her region and beyond (MFA Publications, 2010).

According to the Turkish MFA Publications released in its web-site;

Turkey believes that the economic and social threats, particularly poverty, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, natural and man-made disasters should be addressed by the international community as an integral part of global collective security, without losing sight of benefits of development as a pillar by its own (MFA Publications, 2010).

Within above mentioned context, Turkey has been making voluntary contributions to United Nations Funds, Programmes and Agencies as well as other International Organizations⁵, such as UN International Drug Control Programme, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, World Health Organization, UN Development Programme, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, World Bank Iraq Fund, UN Development Group International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, Special Court for Sierra Leone, UNIDO Centre for Regional Cooperation in Turkey, Regional Trust Fund for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, UN Children's Fund, UN Development Fund for Women, UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, etc. The voluntary financial contributions of Turkey to the UN Funds and other international organizations and programs can be given by year as follows: 17.514.021 USD in year 2008; 8.766.375 USD in year 2007; 18.133.125 USD in year 2006, further, Turkey's official development assistance for the year 2006 has reached 700 million USD; 16.191.646 + 10.343.925 USD in 2005 (MFA 2010 and UN Publications, 2010).

Though MFA rightly states that, "security can no longer be achieved solely through military means and policies", this study will focus mainly on Turkey's military contribution to the Global Security, since military contributions are much more on the spot in terms of her pivotal middle power role in global security. Besides being a country with the second largest army in all aspects in NATO after the USA, being a member of NATO, European Council and OSCE make military and policing contributions of Turkey much more valuable to mention.

Turkey's contribution to the global security by means of her military assets started in 1950 with the Korean War in which Turkey participated with a brigade. Turkey, on a rotational basis, sent a total of 15,000 personnel to Korea from 1950 to 1953. To start from this point Turkey makes a substantial contribution to various international peace-keeping activities. Since the end of the

⁵ See the Annex I as an example, for the financial aid details of Turkey and the names of the UN agencies and other international organizations in year 2008.

Second World War, Turkish troops have served under numerous UN, OSCE, NATO and EU (ESDP) missions. It is possible to classify the security services of Turkey to the global security affairs and missions in four aspects: “The observation services, UN leading and governing peace force operations, the peace support operations of which is being committed, and the policing services” (Bagci and Kardas, 2004).

The main operations and missions Turkey involved can be given as follows: UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) between 1988-1991 with 10 personnel; UN Iraq-Kuwait Military Observer Group (UNIKOM) between 1991-2003 with 75 personnel; Operation “Sharp Guard”, aimed at monitoring the embargo towards Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992-1996 with naval assets; Operation “Deny Flight”, aimed at implementing flight restriction over Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1993-1996 with an F-16 squadron; UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1993-1995 with a mechanized regiment of 1450 troops; UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) between 2000-2001 with one military advisor. UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-II) between 1993-1994 with over 300 troops, and for more than a year, this operation was held under the command of a Turkish General.

Turkey has also made contributions to other UN Peacekeeping Operations. In other words, “Turkey is firmly committed to UN peacekeeping and currently participates in 11 UN peacekeeping missions. The most recent commitment of Turkey was to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). A Turkish Engineering Construction Company and Turkish Navy units have joined the UNIFIL, following the decision of the Turkish Parliament adopted on 5 September 2006” (MFA 2010a). Turkey participated and contributed to UN peace building operations in Burundi, Central African Republic and Chad, Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, Lebanon, Kosovo, Liberia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Cote d’Ivoire, with both police officers and military staff. The names of UN Missions Turkey took place can be detailed as follows: BINUB, MINURCAT, MINUSTAH, MONUC, UNAMID, UNMIK, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMIT, UNOCI, UNTAES, UNOMIG, UNIPTF and UNTAET (MFA 2010a).

According to the MFA’s official publications, Turkey currently has 296 police officers, and approximately 500 military officers serving in UN peace keeping operations in Europe, Asia, Africa and America. In this regard, Turkey is one of the leading countries in terms of contribution in police officers and military staff to such operations (MFA 2010b). Besides that according the data collected, Turkish Military has actively taken part in, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony in Macedonia. Turkish military has also attended EU launched military crisis management operations called “Concordia” and “Proxima”. For the time being, in total, over 750 Turkish troops are currently serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF – Afghanistan) in Kabul, under the existing UN mandate (UNSCR 1386), by assuming strategic coordination, command and control of the operation. Thus, ISAF became the first ever NATO operation conducted beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

In this vein, Turkey first assumed the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan between June 2002 and February 2003 for a period of eight months, with 1400 troops. Turkey maintained its support to ISAF after it became a NATO operation in August 2003. Turkey once again had the leadership of the ISAF-VII operation, this time under the NATO banner, with over 1400 troops from 13 February till 4 August 2005. Turkey has also assumed the responsibility to maintain Kabul International Airport during her leadership of ISAF-VII. Turkey's role continued within ISAF. SEEBRIG (South Eastern European Brigade) assumed the responsibility of Kabul Multinational Brigade Headquarters between February and August 2006, in which Turkey has also participated actively.

Under the new structure of ISAF with six regional commands, the leadership of the Central Command in Kabul (Regional Command-Capital - RCC) has been assumed jointly by Turkey, France and Italy, on a rotational basis for a two year term commencing in August 2006. Turkey commanded the RCC between April 2007 and December 2007 and the Turkish contingent serving there was raised to 1200 personnel, including the crew of the two general utility helicopters throughout this period. Moreover, France and Italy separated from RCC in November 2009 and Turkey has taken over the leadership. In addition to the present Turkish contingent (consisting of 1828 soldiers), Turkey has two PRTs, one in Wardak, one in Jowzjan. For the support of Afghan National Security Forces, Turkey deployed 5 OMLTs and 1 POMLT, also 159 mentor/instructors to various training facilities.

Alongside its troop contribution, the Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Minister Hikmet Çetin, served with distinction in Kabul as NATO's Senior Civilian Representative from January 2004 till August 2006.

Another contribution of Turkey to the global security operations was NATO Training Mission of Iraq. At 2004, Istanbul Summit NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to assist Iraq with training of its security forces. Subsequently, the North Atlantic Council was tasked to develop the modalities to implement this decision with the Iraqi Interim Government. On 30 July 2004, a NATO Training Implementation Mission was established. The name of the mission was subsequently changed to NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM). The Iraqi Staff College was founded in Rustamiyah. Turkey currently has 2 staff officers in NTM-I. Also, more than 110 Iraqi personnel have been trained in Turkey since the inception of the mission.

Turkey has also made contributions to the NATO Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Some of the assistance operations are as follows: Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Pakistan Earthquake in 2005, floods that occurred in Algeria in February 2006 and, Evacuation of Turkish and other personnel from Lebanon during the war in August 2006.

Perhaps one of the assistance operations, namely Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) deserves the largest attention in terms of highlighting Turkey's perception of global security versus national security. It has become a thorny issue not only for Turkish domestic politics but also for Turkish foreign policy. It has been widely discussed among Turkish public opinion. Within these

discussions, some criticized presence of foreign troops both because of their role in Turkey and in the region. Similarly, it caused some disputes and tensions in Turkey's relations with its neighbors, particularly with Iraq.

As known, at the end of the 1st Gulf War, after the atrocity in Halapcha, more than 400.000 displaced people headed toward Turkey and more than 1 million to Iran in April 1991. Turkey accepted hundreds of thousands of people within her territory and provided humanitarian assistance. In this regard, Turkey built shelters and did her best to meet the fundamental needs of displaced people both along and inside Turkish borders and helped refugees to go back to Northern Iraq in safety. Turkey did also cooperate with foreign NGOs to use her territory to transmit aid materials to the north of Iraq. The no-fly zone over the north of Iraq was established and in accordance with UN Resolution 688 the Joint Task Force Provide Comfort was formed in 1991 and was deployed to Incirlik Air Base in Adana in order to provide immediate relief assistance for the people in the north of Iraq, who were suffering due to the economic blockade by the central administration, as well as to exterminate the influence of Saddam Hussein in the north of 36th parallel.

According to Gözen, OPC has been questioned basically because of foreign troops, staff and NGO presence:

Some questioned their role in Turkey and the region in general. They disputed the objective of the OPC forces in Turkey due to their alleged abuse of Turkey's national interests. In their opinion, the OPC forces were helping the Kurds to set up a Kurdish state in the region, and thus threatening Turkey's national and territorial integrity. They also argued that in order to achieve this objective, the forces were giving logistic and intelligence support to the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). Therefore, they demanded their removal from Turkey sooner than later (Gözen, 1996:2).

OPC's original objective was to protect people of Northern Iraq but this soon become ambiguous. It seemed to become an instrument for US to achieve her objectives over Iraq that is, to keep control over Iraq and the region⁶. Despite discussions over its probable negative implications on Turkey's domestic and foreign politics because of their long-stay, the issue of OPC has not been discussed much enough in political scheme, except for the debates in Turkish General National Assembly (TNGA) at the time of the extension of duration. But all these criticisms remained as temporal reactions, and evaporated after the extension by TNGA. This made the discussions be low profiled.

⁶ Critics have focused on controlling the natural resources of the region.

2.2. The Services Provided by the Turkish Forces in Missions of Global Security Operations

When the role and position of the Turkish forces in the security mission operations are analyzed, it is possible to summarize the work done, in accordance with the mission regulations, as follows⁷:

Security Service: The main aim is to stop conflict between sides, and to prevent destroying houses, official, religious and school buildings, lands and other type of properties. It also prevented other types of criminal activities, and enforced the law and made the judicial system work. In short, the first and main job they have to do is to provide peace and secure order in the conflicting and/or post-conflicting society.

Education and Training Service for Local Police and Military Forces: In accordance with the mission program, Turkey and her security officials take part in education and training programs of the re-establishing new political structure concerning police officers and military staffs' training and education. This helps to restore order in the country, and prepare the future policing and military forces.

Traffic Services: In this process, the security forces providing a smooth and proper traffic order both in cities and high ways. The local traffic officers are also educated and trained for the future to serve in the country.

Controlling Borders, Smuggling & Human Trafficking: The main aim is to prevent the illegal border crossings, smuggling and human trafficking across the borders of country. In addition, the custom affairs are organized and operated according to the legal regulations of the mission took place. The local custom staff are also trained and educated for the future, who will replace the international custom staff when the mission ended and they left the country.

Social Services: Although it is not the main duty, the security staff and the mission people help to local people and their non-governmental organizations to solve their social and economical problems such as restoring schools, common public houses, religious and cultural buildings, food distributions, etc. They also give health services such as checking up, treatment, vaccinations, Sunna (circumcision) to the local people from time to time. The Turkish army gives media services and trainings by helping and supporting local media such as running radio and TV stations and publishing daily or weekly news papers or journals. Besides that they organize cocktails and ceremonies in official dates, inviting local people and constructing good relationships with them.

As it is clear, implementation of peace restoring/keeping, enforcement operations, having a *sine qua non* characteristic, would be somewhat risky and in some cases there might even not be possible to find the best proper way or instruments. It would be better to discuss advantages and disadvantages of those missions.

⁷ The explanations given are based on the observation and interview notes of the author, when he was serving as an OSCE election department staff in the UN Mission in Kosovo between June 2001 and December 2002. It is also learned that from the interview done with the security staff who did serve in the different missions that Turkey took part over the World.

The advantages and disadvantages of mission operations to provide global security can be given as follows:

The advantages:

- Ending the conflicts and saving lives,
- Establishing a secure and democratic system,
- Rebuilding bombed houses, bridges, roads and to help people to re-establish own lives,
- Re-establishing all bureaucratic institutions, political parties, media which will serve to public,
- Establishing interaction between mission staff and local people, helping an understanding of multi-culturalism,
- Performing professionalism and show locals to do their jobs in a professional way without discrimination,
- Getting benefit of renting houses, giving different services to international staff.
- Member countries joining the mission or operation get an experience of close collaboration and working together.

The Disadvantages:

- The powerful countries occupy the country for a long period and they mainly struggle for their own interest, and establishing a system, regime and country as they want to get benefit.
- In UN operations, some police officers come from undeveloped countries, and have very bad communication and experience with the local people. They culturally, socially and politically are backward than the local people⁸.
- In case of danger, some military staff and police officers do not interfere the case,
- Corruption gets common in daily activities,
- Some mission people behave as the boss of local people, and imposing their cultural norms⁹,
- There is a great hope among the local people for the Mission. If the Mission does not solve the problems soon, people get frustrated /disappointed (e.g. More than 100 vehicles of UN put on fire on the 17 March 2003 after the Mitrovica event in Kosovo).

Although the best option is not to have a need for missions, it is consequently possible to say that mission operations have more advantages than disadvantages because of ending conflicts, killings, forced mass migrations, and restoring and keeping peace, re-building social, economical, political and judicial institutions.

^{8,9} The author has observed many such cases during his work between year 2001 and 2003 in United Nations and OSCE Mission (UNMIK OSCE) in Kosovo.

As a consequence, Turkey as an actor who contributes to the global security, i.e. preventing conflicts, peacemaking, peace keeping, rehabilitation, reforming and capacity building, plays an important role as one of the world leading countries. While these efforts cost a lot in terms of finance and human capital, Turkey would get benefit of political, military and economic aspects. In other words, the contribution of Turkey to global security makes Turkey internationally more respected one and gets an image of a country serving for the global peace process. This would also contribute to and develop the image of the country as a strong actor in the world political, economical and military affairs and disputes. It would also be possible to develop close cooperation with the countries the missions take place and the allied forces and countries serving in missions. In addition, the Turkish security forces get experiences of both serving in real conflict situations. Turkey would have more opportunities economically with the country the mission takes place, i.e. having new collaborations and markets for the future. The current world affairs unfortunately show that there would be more need for the security mission operations. It is hoped that the UN would be the only leading and governing power of the missions. Otherwise, as mentioned, the powerful countries taking place in mission put their interest at first. If so, while the mission is solving some problems in one side it creates new problems in the other.

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ANNEX I: TURKEY'S VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS FUNDS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS IN 2008 (MFA 2010 <http://www.un.int/turkey/page290.html>)

1. United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) - \$500.000
2. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund (CPCJF) - \$100.000
3. United Nations Fund for Contemporary Forms of Slavery - \$6.000
4. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) - \$50.000
5. United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (UN-INSTRAW) - \$25.000
6. United Nations Volunteers Fund (UNV) - \$10.000
7. United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) - \$100.000
8. United Nations Trust Fund for African Development (UNTFAD) - \$100.000
9. UN Fund for the Victims of Torture - \$10.000
10. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) \$500.000
11. Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization - \$12.000
12. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - \$50.00
13. Least Developed Countries Fund (LDC) - \$200.000
14. The General Secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference - \$413
15. "United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) - \$200.000
16. International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) - \$150.000
17. International Children's Centre - \$1.345.00
18. UNRWA Regular and Emergency Food Aid Fund - \$250.000
19. World Health Organization (Project on Polio Eradication) - \$50.000
20. United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) - \$25.000
21. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LIREC) - \$20.000
22. United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) - \$20.000
23. UNDP (Eradication of Poverty) - \$75.000
24. UNDP (for several other regional funds and projects) - \$200.000
25. Global Digital Solidarity Fund - \$50.000
26. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR) - \$100.000
27. The Hague Academy of International Law - \$2.000
28. United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Initiative - \$500.000
29. UNIDO (Master Budget) Contribution for 2008 - \$ 607.716
30. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) - \$150.000
31. United Nations Development Program (Contribution to the master budget) - \$1.057.988
32. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) - \$150.000
33. Central Emergency Response Fund - \$300.000
34. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - \$200.000
35. World Food Program - \$100.000
36. Industrial Development Fund for United Nations
Industrial Development Program Projects Workshop and Study Tour on Food Laboratories – \$35.313

37. Framework convention on Tobacco Control 2008-2009 - \$43.179
38. International Organization for Migration - \$169.608
39. World Health Organization Main Budget - \$1.758.256
40. WHO- Tropical Disease Research - \$5.000
41. UN International Institute for the Unification of Private Law - -\$28.465
42. UN International Institute for Disarmament Research- \$5.000
43. United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS - \$1.000.000
44. For the meeting of United Nations Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty -\$4.251
45. United Nations Population Fund Elimination of Violence against Woman Project- \$1.897.056
46. Food and Agriculture Organization Main Budget- Initial Payment - \$1.079.659
47. Food and Agriculture Organization Main Budget- Second Payment - \$830.914
48. Food and Agriculture Organization - Central Asia sub- Regional Office - \$300.000
49. Food and Agriculture Organization - Contribution for Central Asia sub-regional Office- \$2.000.000
50. United Nations World Tourism Organization -\$234.975
51. United Nations Development Program -(project on e-consulate)-\$250.000
52. Drylands Development Center - \$10.000
53. United Nations Youth Fund- \$10.000
54. UN Voluntary Fund on Disability -\$10.000
55. UN Trust Fund for Ageing -\$10.000
56. Trust Fund For the Repertory Practices of the UN organs -\$5.000
57. Fund for the Classification of the United Nations Security Council Archives -\$5.000
58. The Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund -\$51.248
59. UN Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations -\$5.000.060. Fund for Reform of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs -\$50.000
61. UN Children Fund -\$100.000
62. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
Voluntary Contribution for 60th Anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights -\$50.000
63. UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament - Asia- Pacific Region -\$60.000
64. Voluntary contribution for the deposit fund of
' International Conference on Financing for Development ' which to be hold in Doha - \$50.000
65. Reform of the Un Department of the Political Affairs - \$40.000
66. Voluntary contribution for the deposit fund of the Landlocked Development Countries - \$200.000

Total : 17.514.021 USD.

About The Contributors

Professor Dr. Yonah Alexander

Director, Inter-University Center of Terrorism Studies

Yonah Alexander is professor emeritus at the State University of New York and is also currently Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. He is a Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and Director of its International Center for Terrorism Studies, as well as Co-Director of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (at the International Law Institute). Professor Alexander is the former Director of Terrorism Studies at the George Washington University and the State University of New York, totaling 35 years of service. Educated at Columbia University (Ph.D.), the University of Chicago (M.A.), and Roosevelt University of Chicago (B.A.), Professor Alexander taught at the George Washington University, American University, Columbus School of Law at Catholic University of America, Tel Aviv University, The City University of New York, and The State University of New York. He has also lectured at numerous institutions and universities. He has published over 95 books on the subjects of international affairs and terrorism.

Guy B. Roberts

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Guy B. Roberts is the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director, Nuclear Policy Planning Directorate for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In that capacity he is responsible for developing policy on issues related to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and overseeing NATO's nuclear deterrence posture. Previously Mr. Roberts was Principal Director for Negotiations Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense responsible for advising senior Defense Department officials on the entire range of United States arms control and non-proliferation policies. He was also responsible for implementing policy guidance and DoD positions for current and emerging proliferation issues in multilateral arms control and disarmament fora.

Mr. Roberts received his law degree from the University of Denver, and he holds masters degrees in international and comparative law from Georgetown University, in international

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Mr. Prosen is Counterterrorism Coordinator at the Office of European Security and Political Affairs, United States, State Department. He is also co-ordinating studies with NATO. He has participated so many seminars related to security issues. He has published articles on international security.

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William J. Olson is a Distinguished Professor for International Security Studies at the College for International Security Affairs, National Defense University (NDU). He has also taught at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at NDU. Most recently, he was Chief of the Information Management Unit in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), Baghdad, Iraq. He was formerly the Staff Director for the US Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. The Caucus, co-chaired by Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa, is a formal organization of the Senate with the status of a standing committee. Before joining the Caucus, Dr. Olson was a Senior Fellow at the National Strategy Information Center, a Washington think tank. His published works include over 50 articles and books on light forces, US strategic interests in the Persian Gulf, the Iran-Iraq war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, terrorism, the war on drugs, conflict management, and studies on international organized crime and homeland security.

Ambassador (R) Edward Marks

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Ambassador Marks was a Foreign Service Officer of the United States from 1959-1995, when he retired with the rank of Minister-Counselor. He served in the U.S. Army from 1956-1958, after graduating from his university. During his career with the Foreign Service he served in Kenya, Mexico, Angola, Zambia, Belgium and Zaire. He was Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from 1977-1980, Deputy Director of the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism from 1981-1985, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies from 1985-1986, Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge Affairs in Sri Lanka and the Maldives from 1986-1989, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations from 1989-1993, and Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University from 1993-1995. He also was Adjunct Assistant Professor ("Politics of International Economics") at New York University from 1990-1993. Since 1995, he has been a consultant to the World Food Program and the United Nations Development Program (on reorganization of the foreign affairs ministries of several countries that were former members of the Soviet Union). He is currently an active consultant, lecturer, and writer on crisis management and U.N. affairs, and he is the Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Foreign Service Journal. He graduated from the University of Michigan (BA, Political Science, 1956), the Foreign Service Institute (BA, Economics, 1969), the University of Oklahoma (MA, Economics, 1975), the National War College (1981). He is the recipient of three Department of State Senior Performance Awards and speaks French, Portuguese, and Spanish. He has published extensively on terrorism, international peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, simulation training, and the United Nations

Dr. Richard Weitz

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Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign, defense, homeland security, and WMD nonproliferation policies. Dr. Weitz also is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), where he oversees case study research, and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where he contributes to various defense projects.

Before joining Hudson, Dr. Weitz worked for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Defense Science Board, DFI International, Inc., the Center for Strategic Studies, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Dr. Weitz is a graduate of Harvard College (B.A. with Highest Honors in Government), the London School of Economics (M.Sc. in International Relations), Oxford University (M.Phil. in Politics), and Harvard University (Ph.D. in Political Science). He is proficient in Russian, French, and German.

Dr. Weitz has published in such journals as The National Interest, The Washington Quarterly, NATO Review, Global Asia, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Defense Concepts, Pacific Focus, Small Wars Journal, Political Science Quarterly, Jane's Intelligence Review, and The Journal of Strategic Studies. His commentaries have appeared in the International Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun, The Guardian, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal (Europe), Middle East Times, and many Internet-based publications such as those of the WashingtonPost.com and World Politics Review, where he is Senior Editor. Dr. Weitz has appeared on the BBC, CNN, C-SPAN, PBS, ABC, FOX, MSNBC, VOA, UK Channel 4, ITN, France 24, CBC, CTV, ARD, KSA, Al-Hurra, Al-Jazeera, Al-Alam, PressTV, Pacifica Radio, and additional broadcast media. He has delivered numerous presentations at conferences, panels, and other events.

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Prof. Çağlar published books, book chapters and articles in respected journals and publishers. He has appeared in many TV programs.

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√ Articles should have 150-200 words Abstract and Key Words. Both the abstracts and key words should be written in font size 8 and be single-spaced. The number of the key words should be 4 to 7.

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- (Best and Nocella, 2004:8)

- (Wieviopka, 1995: 598)

- (Hoffman, 2006:3)

- (Alexander, 2009)

√ Examples of footnotes are as follows;

1 Best, Steve and Nocella, Anthony J., (2004), "Defining Terrorism", *Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal*, Vol.2, No.1, p.8.

2 Wieviopka, Michel, (1995), "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research", Martha Crenshaw (Ed.), *Terrorism in Context*, USA:Pennsylvania State University Press, p.598.

3 Hoffman, Bruce, (2006), *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press, p.3.

4 Alexander, Yonah, (2009), "Some Perspectives on Turkey's Counter Terrorism Strategy", Ker-Lindsay, James and Alastair, Cameron (Ed.), *Combatting International Terrorism, Turkey's Added Value*, London: RUSI Publications, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Turkey_terrorism.pdf, (Accessed on 12.09.2010).

√ The references that are made within the text should be listed at the end of the paper as BIBLIOGRAPHY. Bibliography should use following style;

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Best, Steve and Nocella, Anthony J., (2004), "Defining Terrorism", *Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal*, Vol.2, No.1, pp.1-18.

Wieviopka, Michel, (1995), "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research", Martha Crenshaw (Ed.), *Terrorism in Context*, USA: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp.597-606.

Hoffman, Bruce, (2006), *Inside Terrorism*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Alexander, Yonah, (2009), "Some Perspectives on Turkey's Counter Terrorism Strategy", James Ker-Lindsay and Cameron Alastair (Ed.), *Combating International Terrorism, Turkey's Added Value*, London: RUSI Publications, pp.4-5, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Turkey_terrorism.pdf, (Accessed on 12.09.2010).

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√ The academic title, profession and e-mail of the author and his professional affiliation should be written in 8 point as footnote at the end of the first page.

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